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Defendant/Appellee, Thomas E. Reese, by and through his counsel of record, 
hereby submits the following Brief. 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
This is an appeal by the Plaintiff, Sheila Reese, from an Amended Decree of 
Divorce entered by the Third District Court, Salt Lake County (the "District Court"), the 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley presiding. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Amended Decree of Divorce pursuant 
to Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Court of Appeals and Section 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Ann. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES 
The provisions of the Utah Code, Sections 78-45-1 through 78-45-13 (Utah 
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act) are attached hereto as Appellee's Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce action filed by Appellant Sheila Reese against Appellant 
Thomas E. Reese on March 13, 1995. (R. 001-008). Defendant Thomas Reese filed his 
answer on April 13, 1995. (R. 013-017). 
The matter came on for trial before the District Court on June 4 through 
June 5, 1996. On July 9, 1996, the District Court entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. (R. 129-138) and thereafter entered a Decree of Divorce on August 14, 
1996. (R. 139-144). Based upon Defendant's motion, the District Court entered an Amended 
Decree of Divorce on October 16, 1996. The Plaintiff now appeals from the entry of the 
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Amended Decree of Divorce. The Amended Decree of Divorce addresses child support, 
alimony, and the distribution of property. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married on January 14, 1985. (R. 129). The parties were 
separated on March 29, 1992. (R. 207). The parties have one child, Cherina, bom as issue 
of this marriage on September 14, 1986. (R. 130). Custody of Cherina was awarded to 
Plaintiff pursuant to the stipulation of the parties entered on the record at the time of trial. 
QcL). 
Plaintiff is employed part-time in two jobs by Granite School District. In one 
job, she is paid $8 per hour and in the other, she is paid $11 per hour (R. 130, 193). The 
District Court that her total income from Granite School District is $586 per month. Plaintiff 
voluntarily chooses to work part-time to remain at home with her daughter who was almost 
10 years old at the time of trial. (R. 130). 
Based upon Plaintiffs experience and her voluntary underemployment, the 
District Court imputed income to her at the lower rate of $8 per hour, for an imputed monthly 
income of $1,280 (assuming 160 paid hours per month). (R. 130). Plaintiff also enjoys net 
rental income of $776 per month, for a total gross monthly income and imputed income of 
$2,056, excluding child support. (R. 130-131). Plaintiff testified that since the parties were 
separated (March 1992) and the trial, she has been able to meet her expenses and even save 
money. (R. 223-225). Plaintiff also testified that her itemized monthly expenses of $1,436 
were accurate (R. 232), with the exception of her personal health insurance (R. 220) and 
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lessons for the parties' child, for which Defendant had been paying one-half. (R. 239). The 
District Court found that Plaintiffs reasonable monthly expenses are $1,436 per month and 
that Plaintiffs income and imputed income, together with child support, would be more than 
enough to meet her expenses and maintain the standard of living enjoyed during the parties' 
marriage. (R. 131). 
Defendant is employed as a school teacher with a gross monthly income of 
$3,409, plus net rental income at the time of trial of $183 per month, for a total of $3,592 per 
month. (R. 131). Defendant's reasonable monthly expenses at the time of trial were in the 
amount of $2,209, exclusive of expenses incurred as a result of attorney's fees and settlement 
of a previous civil lawsuit and of child support obligations. (R. 131). The District Court also 
ordered Defendant to maintain a life insurance policy in the amount of $100,000 until the 
parties' child reaches 18 years of age. (R. 171). After trial but before entry of the Amended 
Decree of Divorce, Defendant also became obligated to pay child support for another child 
from a previous marriage in the amount of $346 per month. (R. 150-158). The District 
Court denied Defendant's motion to amend the divorce decree to reflect this change in 
Defendant's current obligations. 
The District Court did not award alimony to either party and ordered Defendant 
to pay child support, based upon the Plaintiffs income and imputed income and Defendant's 
income discussed above, as required by Utah law. (R. 131). 
Shortly after the parties' marriage, Plaintiff acquired through an advance on an 
inheritance certain real property located on Herbert Avenue in Salt Lake City (the "Herbert 
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Avenue" property), with a value of $70,000 at that time and a current market value of 
$148,000. (R. 133). During the course of the parties' marriage, Defendant made substantial 
contributions to the Herbert Avenue property, thereby maintaining and enhancing its value. 
(R. 133). These contributions included installing a badly-needed new roof (R. 203-204), 
paying to paint and remodel a portion of the interior (R. 208), building planter boxes, doing 
yardwork, and making miscellaneous repairs. (R. 208-209). 
As consideration for the work Defendant did on the Herbert Avenue property, 
the parties entered an agreement in 1988 whereby Plaintiff granted Defendant a twenty-five 
percent (25%) interest in the Herbert Avenue property. (R. 133). Plaintiff also executed and 
delivered a Quit Claim Deed in favor of Defendant, granting Defendant a twenty-five percent 
(25%) interest in the Herbert Avenue property. (R. 229). The District Court found that this 
agreement was valid, supported by consideration, and was not the result of coercion or duress 
and therefore awarded Defendant a 25% interest in the Herbert Avenue property. (R. 133). 
In addition to Defendant's deeded 25% interest in Herbert Avenue, the District 
Court found that Defendant had made additional contributions for specific improvements 
which entitled Defendant to an additional equitable interest of $3,570. (R. 133). The value 
of Defendant's 25% interest in the Herbert Avenue property, plus the $3,570, less Plaintiff's 
one-half interest in Defendant's retirement account, resulted in a lien in Defendant's favor in 
the amount of $26,224. (R. 134). 
Between January 11, 1990 and March 13, 1992, Defendant also paid Plaintiff a 
total of $4,850 which Defendant contended was to purchase an additional interest in the 
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Herbert Avenue property. Although the District Court rejected Defendant's position on these 
payments (R. 133-134 and Def. Ex. 8-6), Plaintiff acknowledged receiving and using the 
money during the course of the parties' marriage. (R. 233-234). 
Prior to the marriage, Plaintiff had an interest in certain real property located 
on Scott Circle in Salt Lake City (the "Scott Circle" property). At the time of the marriage, 
the Scott Circle property had a value of about $62,000 and a current market value at the time 
of trial of $118,000. (R. 134). During the course of the parties' marriage, the Scott Circle 
property was rented continuously. (R. 211). While the parties were married, the rental 
income from Scott Circle was used to pay off the mortgage and to repay a loan used to have 
the property remodeled. (R. 210-212). Although Defendant did perform some maintenance 
on the Scott Circle property, his contributions were not sufficient to create an equitable 
interest in the property and title was always in the Plaintiffs name. For those reasons, the 
District Court awarded the Scott Circle property to Plaintiff. (R. 135). 
Approximately one year after the parties' separation, Defendant purchased a 
fifty percent (50%) interest in a duplex located on Belaire Drive in Salt Lake City. The 
source of Defendant's down payment was an inheritance and Plaintiff has made no 
contributions to this property. The Belaire property was (and is) subject to a significant 
mortgage in the amount of $126,087 at the time of trial. (Def. Ex. 7). Therefore, the District 
Court awarded the Belaire property to Defendant. (R. 135). 
With respect to real property, therefore, Defendant ended up with a $26,224 
interest in the Herbert Avenue and Belaire Drive property, subject to a significant mortgage. 
5 
On the other hand, Plaintiff was awarded Scott Circle with a current market value of 
$118,000 and Herbert Avenue, with a current market value of $148,000, less Defendant's lien 
in the amount of $26,224. The value of Plaintiffs appreciable real estate interests are nearly 
$240,000. 
Defendant's total debts and obligations exceeded $167,000 at the time of trial. 
(Def. Ex. 7). On the other hand, Plaintiffs financial statement (Def. Ex. 2) and trial 
testimony indicate that she had no long-term debts at the time of trial beyond her normal 
living expenses. (R. 220-226). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in imputing income to 
Plaintiff using the lower of Plaintiffs current rate of pay of $8 per hour, based upon her clear 
testimony that she is voluntarily underemployed. The District Court did not abuse its 
discretion by refusing to impute minimum wage to the Plaintiff because Plaintiff is currently 
earning $8 per hour part of the time and $11 per hour part of the time. The District Court, 
based upon Plaintiff's age, work history during the entire course of the parties' marriage, and 
current salary, was justified in imputing full-time income to Plaintiff at the rate of $8 per 
hour to arrive at a gross monthly salary of $1,280. The District Court properly used the 
imputed amount of $1,280 and the net rental income amount of $776 to arrive at a gross 
monthly income for purposes of calculating child support in the amount of $2,056. There is 
no error. 
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2. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in not awarding alimony 
to Plaintiff. The parties were married and living together for seven years. Plaintiff's rental 
and imputed monthly income of $2,056, with the addition of child support in the amount of 
$372 per month ($2,428), as offset by Plaintiffs claimed living expenses of $1,436, leaves 
Plaintiff with a net monthly income and imputed income of $992. This income is in addition 
to significant appreciable assets (with a current market value of approximately $240,000), 
including the Scott Circle property, owned by Plaintiff without encumbrance, and the Herbert 
Avenue property, owned by Plaintiff with a lien in favor of Defendant in the amount of 
$26,224. On the other hand, Defendant does not have a net monthly "windfall" as Plaintiff 
argues. To the contrary, when all of Defendant's debts and obligations are considered, 
Defendant has no discretionary income. 
3. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in using Plaintiff's 
imputed income in calculating Defendant's child support obligations. 
4. The District Court did not err in recognizing the post-marital agreement 
of the parties, together with a quit claim deed, granting Defendant a one-quarter interest in 
the Herbert Avenue property. The agreement and quit claim deed are supported by adequate 
consideration and represent enforceable contracts. 
5. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in honoring an agreement 
and quit claim deed duly executed and delivered by Plaintiff granting Defendant a one-quarter 
interest in the Herbert Avenue property. The appreciation of the value of the Herbert Avenue 
property was enhanced and maintained by Defendant's efforts and Plaintiff understood or 
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should have known that by granting Defendant a fixed percentage in the property, the value 
of Defendant's interest would fall or increase as the property value fell or increased over time. 
6. The District Court did not err in failing to award Plaintiff attorney's 
fees. If anything, the District Court erred in failing to award Defendant his attorneys fees as 
expressly provided in the parties' 1988 agreement, which the District Court upheld and 
enforced against Plaintiff. Defendant is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
L PLAINTIFF FAILED TO CARRY HER BURDEN OF 
DEMONSTRATING A CLEAR AND PREJUDICIAL ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION, 
On appeal, the Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the District Court 
abused its discretion with respect to the property distribution. In Bingham v. Bingham, 872 
P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah App. 1994), this Court explained the proper standard of review in 
divorce actions: 
Trial courts have "considerable discretion in determining the 
financial interests of divorced parties." Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 
1018, 1021 (Utah App. 1993). See also Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 
1072, 1074 (Utah 1985). Accordingly, property and alimony 
awards "will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial 
abuse of discretion is demonstrated." Howell v. Howell, 806 
P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 
1991). 
Thus, on appeal, Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the District 
Court not only abused its discretion, but that such abuse of discretion was "clear" and 
"prejudicial." The District Court had "considerable discretion" in determining property 
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allocation and alimony issues. Id As explained below, Plaintiff has failed to carry her 
burden of persuasion on appeal as to every issue raised in her opening brief. 
EL THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY IMPUTED FULL-TIME INCOME 
TO PLAINTIFF AT HER CURRENT SALARY. 
Plaintiffs first argument on appeal is that the District Court improperly imputed 
full-time income to her at the lower of her two current hourly rates for part-time work. 
Plaintiff objects first to the imputation of any income and, second, argues that if imputation of 
income is proper, the District Court should have used the minimum wage. These arguments 
are without merit. 
First, imputation of income was proper. In order to support the imputation of 
income, the trial court's findings must address "the critical question of whether the drop in 
earnings was voluntary/' Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018, 1026 (Utah App. 1993). Here the 
District Court found, and Plaintiff clearly acknowledged at trial, that her underemployment 
was voluntary. (R. 130, 195). 
Second, Plaintiff argues that the lack of evidence in the record regarding 
employment opportunities generally in the community and Plaintiffs employment history 
show that the District Court abused its discretion in using the lower of Plaintiff's hourly 
wages to impute income. These arguments are without merit. 
Section 78-45-7.5(7), Utah Code Ann., provides that the District Court may 
impute income upon a finding of voluntary underemployment "based upon employment 
potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and 
prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community." § 78-45-7.5(7)(b). 
9 
There is no better indication of Plaintiffs "employment potential and probably 
earnings" than her current part-time salary. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
using the hourly rate of $8 per hour as the basis of Plaintiff's full-time earning capacity. 
Plaintiff clearly testified that she is currently paid two rates, $8 and $11 per hour for her part-
time work as a secretary. Plaintiff stated: 
Q. What are you paid for your employment? 
A. I have two different jobs there. One I get $11.00; the 
other one is $8.00. 
(R. 193). 
The record is not clear as to why Plaintiff has two different rates of pay or as 
to the number of hours on average she receives the higher hourly rate. The District Court 
elected to use Plaintiffs lower hourly rate of $8 per hour in calculating imputed income. 
By the terms of the Code, the federal minimum wage should be used only if 
there is no recent work history. § 78-45-7.5(7)(c). While subsection (c) requires that the trial 
court enter specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for imputing a wage higher 
than the federal minimum wage, subsection (c) by its terms applies only "if there is no recent 
work history." Subsection (c) therefore not only does not apply to this action in light of 
Plaintiffs extensive work history and present employment. But even more important, the 
District Court made the required finding of fact justifying the imputation of income at $8 per 
hour, namely, Plaintiffs current income of $8 and $11 per hour. Plaintiff is not earning 
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minimum wage. Plaintiffs current salary is a reasonable basis upon which the District Court 
based its imputation of full-time income at $8 per hour. 
Because Plaintiff has current employment, the statute does not require that 
Defendant hire a vocational expert and present evidence at trial as to job opportunities within 
the community and average salaries in the area. See Hill v. Hill, 867 P.2d 963 (Utah App. 
1994) (affirming the imputation of income based upon an implied finding of voluntary 
underemployment). In the event the Plaintiff were not employed at all and had no job skills, 
it may be necessary to present more extensive evidence as to her earning capacity. However, 
the District Court clearly did not abuse its discretion in imputing full-time income at the 
lower of Plaintiffs current rates of pay. This case was not decided in a vacuum. It is 
common knowledge in this community that unemployment is at the lowest rate in years and 
that even the entry-level, unskilled jobs in this market are paying much more than the current 
minimum wage. If anything, the District Court's use of the $8 per hour figure was very 
conservative and if error was committed, it was committed in Plaintiffs favor. Perhaps the 
District Court should have used an average of Plaintiffs admitted $8 and $11 hourly rates. 
But the District Court did not average the two rates and it was certainly not a clear abuse of 
discretion to use the $8 rate. 
Without any foundation in the record, Plaintiff also argues that she falls within 
two exceptions to the imputation of income: (1) the costs of child care approach or exceed 
the amount of income the Plaintiff could make by curing her underemployment and (2) the 
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parties' child has "unusual emotional needs" which require the custodial parent's presence in 
the home, as provided in Section 78-45-7.5(7)(d). 
Plaintiffs arguments under subsection (d) fail for two reasons. First, subsection 
(d) represents two exceptions to the imputation of full-time income rule for specific situations. 
It is well established rule of statutory construction that the party attempting to fall within the 
exception of a rule of law bears the burden of proof. E.g.. United States v. First City 
National Bank. 386 U.S. 361, 366 (1967) ("where one claims the benefits of an exception to 
the prohibition of a statute," the person claiming that benefit bears the burden of proof); 
United States v. Green, 962 F.2d 938, 941 (9th Cir. 1992); Ekotek Site PRP Committee v. 
Self, 881 F. Supp. 1516 (D. Utah 1995). 
There is absolutely no evidence of record which would support a finding that 
the costs of day care would exceed the amount Plaintiff could earn if she cured her 
underemployment. Plaintiffs argument on page 15 of her brief, claiming that day care 
expenses, together with taxes and expenses, approached the amount of money she could earn 
if she cured her voluntary underemployment, is not supported by the record. The only 
evidence on the issue of day care is Plaintiffs comment that if she were employed full time, 
she would have to have day-care or after-school care for the parties' daughter. (R. 195). 
There is no evidence as to the true necessity for or the cost of such care. On the other hand, 
the District Court was aware that the parties' daughter was nearly ten years old at the time of 
trial and could infer that she did not need costly after-school care in the event of Plaintiffs 
full-time employment. Plaintiff failed to carry her burden of proof that the day care costs 
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approached the additional amount she could earn full time. It was not a clear, prejudicial 
abuse of discretion for the District Court to impute full-time income to Plaintiff based on this 
record. 
In a desperate attempt to fall within the second exception of subsection (d), 
Plaintiff also makes the unfounded, unsupported, and inflammatory argument that the parties' 
daughter "is also emotionally vulnerable, because of the prior conduct of her father."1 
Appellant's Brief at 16. This argument is not only wholly unsupported, but is improper on 
appeal. There is no evidence of record concerning the parties' daughter's emotional condition. 
The fact that Defendant stipulated to supervised visitation does not lead to the conclusion that 
the parties' daughter is "emotionally vulnerable." The parties' child is not emotionally 
vulnerable. She is an excellent student and is involved in many extra-curricular activities, 
such as soccer and piano. The inference that Defendant harmed the parties' child in any way 
is not only false (the case did not involve the parties' daughter), but inflammatory and 
sensational. 
Continuing, in an unconscionable attempt to defame Defendant by innuendo, 
Plaintiffs brief incorrectly states that "Defendant had civil judgments in settlement of sexual 
misconduct cases." Appellant's Brief at 16 (emphasis added). For support, Plaintiff cites the 
District Court's Finding of Fact number 6, where the District Court stated: "Defendant's 
reasonable monthly expenses incurred as a result of attorney's fees and settlement of a sexual 
1Plaintiff failed to cite to this Court wherein the record this argument was preserved for appeal. 
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misconduct civil lawsuit."2 Plaintiff has intentionally mischaracterized Defendant's settlement 
of a single civil case as though Defendant had multiple civil "judgments" entered against him 
in several "cases," thus suggesting not only that there was more than one case, but that 
Defendant was guilty. Mere settlement of a civil case does not mean Defendant 
acknowledged liability. Plaintiffs argument also incorrectly suggests that the civil lawsuit 
involved the parties' daughter. This is also incorrect. The case had nothing to do with the 
parties' daughter, who would have no reason to even know about the civil action. 
But even if the parties' daughter were "emotionally vulnerable" as argued by 
Plaintiff for the first time on appeal, emotional vulnerability is not the standard under the 
code. Rather, the statute requires "unusual emotional . . . needs" which "require the custodial 
parent's presence in the home." Not only is there no evidence that the parties' daughter has 
any unusual emotional needs, the record is silent as to why any such unusual emotional needs 
make it necessary for the Plaintiff to be present in the home. Plaintiffs argument on this 
point is wholly without merit. 
Finally, Plaintiffs argument that Defendant, as a full-time school teacher, is 
voluntarily underemployed, is also lacking in merit. Defendant works more than full time 
during almost ten, not nine months of the year as a school teacher. He is paid monthly. 
During the two months (mid June through mid August) that Defendant is not working as a 
school teacher, he maintains his rental property. During the parties' marriage, Defendant 
2The Court should note that there is no evidence of record concerning the nature of the civil 
lawsuit against Defendant, the parties involved, or the facts and circumstances giving rise to the claim. 
The District Court's statement that Defendant settled a "sexual misconduct civil lawsuit" is totally 
unsupported by the record. Therefore, no inference can be permissibly drawn therefrom. 
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maintained both the Herbert Avenue and Scott Circle properties. There is no authority that 
suggests that the position a full-time school teacher constitutes voluntarily underemployment 
for not having a paying job during the "summer." In order to impute additional income to the 
Defendant, it would be necessary for the District Court to make the express finding that he is 
voluntarily underemployed. The District Court made no such finding and based on the 
record, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the District Court committed a clear, prejudicial 
abuse of discretion on this issue. 
In conclusion, Plaintiff has a current job, worked during the entire time the 
parties were married, is making no less than $8 per hour, and is voluntarily underemployed. 
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion in connection with the District 
Court's decision to impute full-time income to her at the hourly rate of $8. Moreover, 
Plaintiff failed to carry her burden of proof on the two exceptions for imputation of income 
for situations where the cost of child care make full-time employment unreasonable and 
where unusual emotional needs of the child require the presence of the custodial parent in the 
home. The District Court properly imputed income to the Plaintiff at the full-time rate of $8 
per hour. 
HI. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CALCULATED DEFEND ANTS 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS. 
In a related argument, Plaintiff contends on appeal that because the District 
Court improperly imputed full-time income to her at $8 per hour, the District Court therefore 
improperly calculated Defendant's child support obligations. Plaintiffs argument is without 
merit. 
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As discussed above, the District Court correctly imputed full-time income to 
Plaintiff for purposes of calculating Defendant's child support obligations. Contrary to 
Plaintiffs argument, the District Court also did not commit an abuse of discretion in refusing 
to find that Defendant was voluntarily underemployed, thereby justifying an increase in his 
income. 
Plaintiff argues that the District Court should have awarded Plaintiff one-half 
of child care expenses as provided in Section 78-45-7.16(1), Utah Code Ann. This argument 
is without merit. Plaintiff has failed to cite to the record to establish that this issue was 
preserved in the District Court as required by Rule 24(a)(5), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Moreover, Plaintiff failed to present evidence that she intended to obtain full-time 
employment in order to pay all or a portion of child care expenses herself. Plaintiff also 
failed to present any evidence as to the necessity and reasonable cost of such day care 
expenses. The District Court committed no reversible abuse of discretion. 
Finally, citing to the Record at 138 (the mailing certificate for the District 
Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law), Plaintiff argues without any foundation in 
the record that Defendant did not pay adequate child support during the parties' separation and 
therefore the District Court abused its discretion by failing to impose an order withholding 
Defendant's child support obligations. This argument is also lacking in merit. 
At page 132 of the Record, the District Court expressly refused to impose an 
immediate withholding of child support "based on Defendant's timely payment of child 
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support/' In the event Defendant were to fall behind, however, the District Court provided 
for immediate mandatory income withholding relief. 
Between March 1992 and the time of trial, Defendant paid $100 per month for 
child support during the first year of the parties' separation and $150 per month during the 
next three years of the parties' separation. (R. 325). Plaintiff has cited no evidence of record 
suggesting that this amount of child support was inadequate or that it was not paid in a timely 
manner. The District Court's finding that Defendant paid child support in a timely manner is 
not clearly erroneous and is was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to decline to 
impose mandatory withholding. Plaintiff has not established any harm from the District 
Court's order on this issue. If Defendant falls behind, Plaintiff is entitled to immediate 
withholding. There is no harm or error. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY NOT 
AWARDING RETROACTIVE CHILD SUPPORT. 
Next, Plaintiff contends that the District Court abused its discretion by failing 
to award her retroactive child support. More specifically, without any citation to or support 
in the record, Plaintiff argues that retroactive child support is necessary to make up for 
unqualified "child support shortages," alleged to have occurred during the parties' separation. 
Appellant's Brief at 19. This argument is without merit and should be rejected. 
Retroactive child support is not provided for by the Utah Code. This is not to 
say that the District Court may not have equitable powers to impose retroactive child support 
in certain cases, but the Legislature did not provide for retroactive child support in connection 
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with divorce proceedings.3 However, Utah law provides an adequate remedy for custodial 
parents to recover adequate child support after the separation of the parties but before the 
entry of a divorce decree: a temporary order of support. Here, Plaintiff neither sought nor 
obtained a temporary order of support. The District Court may have reasonably inferred that 
Plaintiff sought no temporary order of support precisely because there were no child support 
"shortages" as Plaintiff now argues. To the contrary, Defendant paid Plaintiff $100 per month 
plus the telephone bill during the first year of their separation and $150 per month, less the 
telephone bill, during the next three years of their separation. Plaintiff testified that she was 
able to meet her expenses and save money during this time. (R. 223-225). Defendant's 
consistent payments over the course of four years were adequate to satisfy Defendant's 
obligation to support his child. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45-3, 78-45-4.2. There is no evidence 
of record to support Plaintiffs argument that the payments she received during the four years 
prior to trial were insufficient. 
Nothing in Utah law required the District Court to impose retroactive child 
support. Nothing in the record supports a finding that the Plaintiff suffered from child 
support shortages during the time of the parties' separation. There is no basis from which 
Plaintiff can reasonably that the District Court committed a clear, prejudicial abuse of 
3To be sure, Section 78-45a-3, Utah Code Ann., provides for a four-year statute of limitations 
for a father's liability for past education and necessary support. However, this provision is part of the 
Uniform Act on Paternity and has no application to the instant action and by no means constitutes a 
mandate that retroactive child support was required here. 
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discretion by ordering child support to commence as of the date of the trial. There is no 
error. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DECLINED TO AWARD 
PLAINTIFF ALIMONY. 
Plaintiffs next argument on appeal is that the District Court abused its 
discretion by failing to award her alimony. This argument is also without basis and must be 
rejected. 
Whether to award alimony in a divorce action is committed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the appellant 
demonstrates that the trial court committed a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. 
Bingham, 872 P.2d at 1067. No such abuse of discretion exists here. 
This Court has explained that there are three factors the District Court must 
consider in making an alimony award: 
(1) the financial condition and needs of the party seeking 
alimony; 
(2) that party's ability to produce sufficient income for him 
or herself; and 
(3) the ability of the other party to provide support. 
Hill 869 P.2d at 966 (quoting Thronson v. Thronson, 810 R2d 428, 435 (Utah App.), cert, 
denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991)). While the failure to consider these factors constitutes an 
abuse of discretion, id, in this action, the District Court fully and adequately considered all 
three factors and therefore did not abuse its discretion. 
The record amply supports the District Court's decision not to award alimony 
to either party. The parties were married for only seven years before they were separated in 
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March 1992. Plaintiff's argument that the parties had a "lengthy" marriage of over 11 years 
thus mischaracterizes the reality that they were separated over four years before the trial. 
Plaintiff not only worked during the entire course of the parties' marriage and separation, but 
by the time of trial had (1) paid off and remodeled one duplex on Scott Circle and will enjoy 
rental income therefrom for the foreseeable future; and (2) owned all of the equity in the 
home on Herbert Avenue, subject to Defendant's lien of just over $26,000. Plaintiffs 
unencumbered interest in the Scott Circle and Herbert Avenue properties, both appreciable 
assets, at the time of trial was nearly $240,000. Plaintiff also had a roommate at her Herbert 
Avenue property who paid her $200 per month. Plaintiff is also voluntarily underemployed 
such that any income disparity between the parties is not as significant as characterized by 
Plaintiff on appeal. The District Court also awarded Plaintiff one-half ($14,346) of the entire 
value of Defendant's retirement account with Granite School District, based on their de facto 
marriage of seven years. Plaintiff also has no long-term debt. 
Plaintiff testified at trial that since the parties were separated (March 1992) and 
the trial, she has been able to meet her expenses and even save money. (R. 223-225). 
Plaintiff also testified that her itemized monthly expenses of $1,436 were accurate (R. 232), 
with the exception of her personal health insurance (R. 220) and lessons for the parties' child, 
for which Defendant had been paying one-half. (R. 239). Plaintiff's argument on appeal that 
her income, together with child support, is inadequate to meet her expenses is not supported 
by her own testimony at trial. 
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Based on this evidence, the District Court found that Plaintiffs reasonable 
monthly expenses of $1,436, with child support, "is more than adequate to meet her expenses 
and maintain the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage/' (R. 131). Plaintiffs 
imputed income of $2,056, together with child support in the amount of $372 per month, 
amounts to $2,428 in monthly income and imputed income. Using the District Court's finding 
of reasonably monthly expenses of $1,436, Plaintiff would have almost $1,000 in income per 
month to meet her tax obligations and as excess income. This is roughly the same amount of 
"discretionary" income Plaintiff argues on appeal that Defendant enjoys and does not take into 
account Plaintiff's ownership of significant real property assets. Plaintiffs income, child 
support, and real property assets are more than enough to make up for any health insurance 
for herself, day care expenses, and piano and soccer lessons for her daughter (of which 
Defendant was already paying one-half). 
By comparison, Defendant's financial condition after the divorce is much less 
stable than Plaintiff's. Where Plaintiff has appreciable real property assets valued at nearly 
$240,000, Defendant has long-term debts and obligations in excess of $167,000, including 
real property with a significant mortgage. While it is true that Defendant does have a 
retirement account with a value of $28,692 (R. 132), Defendant has only twelve more years 
of full time employment before he reaches retirement age. 
Plaintiffs argument that Defendant has $1,011 per month in "discretionary" 
income (Appellant's Brief at 28) is erroneous and is not supported by the record. Defendant's 
monthly expenses as found by the District Court did not include his federal and state tax 
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obligations. Based on Defendant's pay stub (Plf s. Ex. 4), Defendant had federal and state 
withholdings, including F.I.C.A., in the amount of $884, leaving only $127 per month under 
Plaintiffs argument. The District Court also did not include (for purposes of calculating 
Defendant's child support obligations) amounts Defendant owes in connection with settlement 
of the prior civil settlement. (R. 131). This amount is $150 per month.4 The amount of 
Defendant's monthly obligations calculated by the District Court also does not include 
payment for a life insurance policy as ordered by the District Court, an additional obligation 
of at least $50 per month. Moreover, after the trial but before the entry of the final Amended 
Decree of Divorce, Defendant became obligated to pay child support in the amount of $346, 
for a minor child from Defendant's previous marriage. (R. 150-158). Because of his 
precarious financial situation, Defendant has also been forced to take out additional loans to 
pay attorneys' fees for this action and appeal and for living expenses. By no means does 
Defendant have any "discretionary" or "extra" income as argued by Plaintiff, much less 
discretionary income in excess of $1,000 per month. The District Court, considering 
Defendant's age and ability to pay, did not abuse its discretion in declining to award Plaintiff 
alimony. 
With respect to health insurance, Plaintiff failed to prove she is uninsurable. 
The District Court made no finding that Plaintiff is uninsurable. It is common knowledge 
that if Plaintiff chose to work full time, she would be entitled to a health insurance benefit as 
4Comparing Defendant's Exhibit 6 (showing monthly expenses in the amount of $2,359), with 
the District Court's finding of monthly expenses of $2,209, shows that the excluded amount is $150 
per month. 
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is Defendant. In fact, if she worked full time for Granite School District, her current 
employer, she would be entitled to the exact same insurance plan the school district provides 
to Defendant. Because Plaintiff is currently insured, she would be entitled to continued 
coverage despite her claim to a pre-existing condition. Moreover, the District Court took into 
consideration Plaintiffs arguments regarding insurance and at Plaintiffs request delayed entry 
of the divorce decree for six months in order to allow Plaintiff to remain on Defendant's 
health insurance as long as possible. By finding that Plaintiff is "capable of supporting . . . 
herself/' the District Court also made the implicit finding that Plaintiffs income would be 
sufficient to cover any additional health insurance needs Plaintiff may have in the future. The 
District Court did not clearly abuse its discretion. 
Plaintiff also argues that alimony was proper in light of the District Court's 
award of $26,224 to Defendant, representing Defendant's interest in the Herbert Avenue 
property, less Plaintiffs one-half interest in Defendant's retirement.5 This argument makes no 
sense and is contrary to Utah law. 
In Mortensen, the Utah Supreme Court explained that the fact that Plaintiff has 
income-producing, inherited property, mitigates against an award of alimony: 
5The Court should note that in her opening brief, Plaintiff has misrepresented that Defendant 
"was awarded the entirety of his retirement account through Granite School District. . . ." Appellant's 
Brief at 29. This argument is false. In reality, the District Court awarded Plaintiff one-half ($14,396) 
of the value of Defendant's retirement with Granite School District (R. 132). If Plaintiff is willing to 
stipulate that the Court erred in awarding Plaintiff one-half of Defendant's entire retirement savings 
(based on a de facto seven year marriage), Defendant would be willing to accept a credit in that 
amount. 
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The fact that one spouse has inherited or donated property, 
particularly if it is income-producing, may properly be 
considered as eliminating or reducing the need for alimony by 
that spouse or as a source of income for the payment of child 
support or alimony (where awarded) by that spouse. 
760 P.2d at 308. 
There is no dispute that the effect of the District Court's ruling leaves Plaintiff 
owning the Scott Circle property, in fee simple, free and clear of any encumbrances and 
owning the Herbert Avenue property, in fee simple, free and clear of any encumbrances other 
than the lien in Defendant's favor in the amount of $26,224. The lien is nothing more than a 
reflection of Defendant's recorded one-quarter ownership of the Herbert Avenue property, in 
addition to a credit of approximately $3,000 for additional money Defendant expended on the 
property. At trial, the Plaintiff failed to present any evidence as to the cost of financing a 
loan to repay Defendant's valid lien or the cost of capital gains taxes in the event of a sale. 
Plaintiffs attempt to raise the argument for the first time on appeal should be rejected. 
Moreover, the District Court was fully aware that Plaintiff may need take out an equity loan 
against her significant real property assets to pay Defendant's lien. The District Court made 
an implicit finding that Plaintiff's rental and job income, together with child support, would be 
sufficient to repay Plaintiffs debt to Defendant, just as the District Court made an implicit 
finding that Defendant's income would be sufficient to pay child support. 
In conclusion, the District Court committed no clear abuse of discretion in 
declining to award Plaintiff alimony. The parties had only a de facto seven year marriage. 
Plaintiff can support herself and is voluntarily underemployed. Plaintiff has significant real 
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property assets, while Defendant has very little equity in the one home he currently owns. 
Plaintiffs net income and imputed income exceeds Defendant's income as explained above. 
And the District Court awarded Plaintiff one-half of the entire value of Defendant's retirement 
account. If anything, the District Court erred in awarding Plaintiff one-half of Defendant's 
retirement account, based on what was only a de facto seven-year marriage. Defendant has 
seven children, besides Cherina, from two previous marriages. Plaintiff only has two other 
children. There was no clear abuse of discretion. 
VI. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RECOGNIZED DEFEND ANTS 
INTEREST IN THE HERBERT AVENUE PROPERTY. 
Plaintiff argues that the District Court abused its discretion in recognizing 
Defendant's one-quarter interest, plus a small additional equitable interest, in the Herbert 
Avenue property. This argument is also without merit and should be rejected. 
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff mischaracterizes the issue on appeal to be 
whether the District Court properly "granted" Defendant an interest in the property and 
properly calculated the amount of that interest. In reality, the District Court did not grant or 
create an interest in Herbert Avenue (other than the equitable lien for $3,570). Defendant's 
one-quarter interest in the Herbert Avenue property was granted by Plaintiff eight years 
before trial as represented by a valid Quit Claim Deed, duly executed, acknowledged, and 
delivered by Plaintiff in July 1988. (R. 229; Def. Ex. 1). Plaintiff testified that she 
understood what it meant to grant Defendant a one-quarter interest in the Herbert Avenue 
property. (R. 229). Granting Defendant a fixed percentage interest in the real property would 
obviously mean that he would be entitled to any increase in the property's value, whether due 
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to market escalation or to improvements made to preserve or enhance the value of the 
property. Defendant's one-quarter interest in Herbert Avenue was fixed in 1988. He is 
obviously entitled to a proportionate share in any gains made in the property from that time. 
The Quit Claim Deed itself, even in the absence of the parties' separate 
Agreement, is prima facie evidence of Defendant's valid, enforceable interest in the Herbert 
Avenue property. Under Utah law, a duly executed and acknowledged quit claim deed "shall 
have the effect of a conveyance of all right, title, interest and estate of the grantor in and to 
the premises therein described, and all rights, privileges, and appurtenances thereunto 
belonging, at the date of such conveyance." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-13. Under Utah law, 
"[a] presumption of valid delivery arises where the deed has been executed and recorded." 
Barlow Society v. Commercial Security Bank 723 P.2d 398, 400 (Utah 1986). "Plaintiff had 
to overcome that presumption of delivery by clear and convincing evidence." Id Here, 
Plaintiff presented no clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of valid 
delivery. Instead, the District Court correctly found that the conveyance was supported by 
consideration and was not obtained by coercion or duress. (R. 133). 
Because Defendant's one-quarter interest in the Herbert Avenue property is 
evidenced by a valid Quit Claim Deed, it was not necessary for the District Court to 
determine whether the consideration for the Deed was exactly equal to the value of the one-
quarter interest in the property. To the contrary, the District Court simply recognized and 
applied the well-established rule that the "[sufficiency of consideration is not necessarily 
measured in terms of money value equivalents." Gorgoza. Inc. v. Utah State Road 
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Commission, 553 P.2d 413, 416 (Utah 1976). In fact, under Utah law, a validly executed and 
delivered deed need not be supported by any consideration at all: "As between the parties a 
deed is good, with or without consideration." Barlow Society. 723 P.2d at 401. "Absent 
fraud, duress, mistake, or the like attributable to the grantee, a competent grantor will not be 
permitted to attack or impeach his own deed." Id 
Here, Plaintiff has not only attempted to attack her own deed, but the 
underlying consideration given for the deed. Plaintiff failed to carry her burden. She should 
not be permitted to attack her own deed because she did not argue fraud, duress or mistake. 
The District Court's finding that the Quit Claim Deed was supported by consideration and was 
not obtained by coercion or duress is not clearly erroneous and therefore must be affirmed. 
It is well established that the trial court is granted significant discretion in 
determining the financial interests of the parties. Bingham, 872 P.2d at 1067. This rule has 
particularly strong application to the trial court's disposition of gifted or inherited property. In 
Mortensen, the Supreme Court noted: 
Significantly, no case has been found where this Court has 
reversed a trial court's disposition of gifts or inherited property 
received by one party during the marriage. In almost every case, 
we have emphasized the wide discretion trial courts have in 
property division and have refrained from laying down any 
general rules for the disposition of gifts and inherited property. 
760 P.2d at 307. The Supreme Court then announced the general rule applicable in equitable 
property distribution issues. The Court stated that Utah trial courts making an equitable 
distribution of inherited property should: 
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generally award property acquired by one spouse by gift and 
inheritance during the marriage . . . to that spouse, together with 
any appreciation or enhancement of its value, unless (1) the 
other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to 
the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, 
thereby acquiring an equitable interest in i t . . . . 
760 P.2d at 308. 
In this action, the District Court properly followed this rule of law. The 
District Court awarded the Scott Circle property to Plaintiff in fee simple, free and clear of 
any encumbrances. The District Court also awarded Herbert Avenue to Plaintiff, subject to 
Defendant's $26,000 lien. At the same time, the District Court properly recognized that 
through Defendant's work, effort and expenses contributed to the enhancement and 
maintenance of the Herbert Avenue property, there was adequate consideration to support 
Plaintiffs previous conveyance of a twenty-five percent interest in the Herbert Avenue 
property and Defendant's equitable interest in the property in the amount of $3,570. (R. 133). 
Defendant's equitable interest is amply supported by the evidence (Def. Ex. D-8, at 8, 9, 10, 
and 11) and is not clearly erroneous. 
Citing to the Record at 338-339, Plaintiff argues that'there was a failure of 
consideration because Defendant "failed to support the family, so as to allow plaintiff to save 
all of her child support for her older children . . . ." (Appellant's Brief at 34). This argument 
is a gross distortion of the parties' Agreement and of the facts. 
The parties' Agreement recites the past consideration for Defendant's twenty-
five percent interest in the Herbert Avenue property. The second paragraph 1 of the 
Agreement provides in part as follows: 
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Tom has not only kept his word regarding the above [relating to 
improvements and maintenance], but because of his financial 
assistance, I have been able to use my monies to pay insurance 
and taxes on the above-mentioned house and property [Herbert], 
payments and expenses on another house and property I solely 
am buying [Scott Circle]; and I have been able to channel the 
child support payments that I receive for my two daughters 
towards their individual savings accounts and miscellaneous 
expenses instead of using it for food and other usual living 
expenses that occur in a family. Tom is continuing these efforts; 
and also facilitating and sharing in the financing and repairs of 
said property to ensure it is painted, and a new roof is put on as 
soon as possible. 
Plaintiff has misconstrued this provision of the Agreement to place a duty on Defendant not 
only to support Plaintiff and their daughter, but also Plaintiffs two other daughters from a 
previous marriage. The language of the Agreement does not support this construction. To 
the contrary, the language merely states that because of Defendant's past support, Plaintiff has 
been able to "channel the child support payments" into "individual savings accounts" of 
Defendant's two step daughters. Moreover, the language of the Agreement places a duty on 
Defendant to "continu[e] these efforts," not a duty to support two children who were not his. 
But more important, the record does not even suggest that Defendant "failed to 
support the family" as argued in Plaintiffs Brief (at 34). On the pages cited by Plaintiff for 
support of this argument (R. 338-339), Plaintiff herself testified that she did not put her two 
other daughters' child support into separate savings accounts, but "let them have it and they 
governed their own money and they saved it, or they would buy clothes, or they would go to 
a movie, but they were in charge of their child support. I let them have their money." (R. 
338). The daughters elected not to save all of their money, but each ended up with $1,500 to 
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$1,700 at the age of 18 when the support ended. (R. 339). Finally, Plaintiff testified that 
Defendant did not pay $1,000 for one of his step daughter's braces, but that the money came 
from her child support. It is this testimony upon which Plaintiff apparently relies to argue 
that Defendant "failed to support the family." Plaintiffs argument that because Defendant did 
not pay for a step daughter's braces, he "failed to support the family," is a gross 
mischaracterization of the record and should not be accepted on appeal. Defendant had no 
legal or moral duty to pay for his step daughter's braces. The step daughter's child support 
from her faither was properly used for that expense. Defendant has eight other children for 
which he has been and is responsible. 
Next, Plaintiff argues that the parties' Agreement is void as against public 
policy, citing Section 30-8-4(2), Utah Code Ann.6 This argument is likewise without merit. 
The provision of the Agreement, paragraph 2, provides that in the event of the parties' 
divorce, Plaintiff will accept Defendant's ownership of the Herbert Avenue property "or a 
reasonable portion thereof." as settlement in full for child support and alimony, (emphasis 
added). Because the language suggests that something less than Defendant's one-quarter 
interest in the Herbert Avenue property may be sufficient in the event of the parties divorce, 
the language is not binding but a recital of an agreement to agree as to settlement terms at 
some point in the future. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the ownership of 
inherited property, especially income producing, is a factor for the court to consider in 
6The Court should note that Plaintiff failed to cite to the record to establish that this argument 
was preserved in the trial court 
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"eliminating or reducing the need for alimony . . . or as a source of income for the payment 
of child support . . . ." Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308. The language of the Utah Code does 
not declare such agreements as void and unenforceable. Rather, the code provides that the 
duty to pay child support "may not be affected by a premarital agreement." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-8-4(2). Plaintiffs agreement to accept Defendant's interest in the Herbert Avenue 
property does not avoid Defendant's child support duty. Rather, it stipulates that Defendant's 
reconveyance of his interest in Herbert Avenue is sufficient consideration to pay Defendant's 
child support obligations. But in any event, this argument is moot because the District Court 
did not attempt to enforce this provision of the Agreement. Rather, the District Court set 
Defendant's child support obligations as provided in the Utah Code. Defendant's child 
support obligations were, in accordance with the code, unaffected by the parties' Agreement. 
There was no error. But even if the parties' Agreement were void, the separate, executed, 
acknowledged and recorded Quit Claim Deed would not be affected. The deed by itself is a 
valid, enforceable conveyance. 
Plaintiff next argues in desperation that the parties' agreement is void because it 
was a will and did not conform to the execution provisions of the probate code.7 Appellant's 
Brief at 34. This argument is equally lacking in merit. 
The parties' Agreement is not a will. No provision of the Agreement 
purporting to transfer Defendant's interest to Plaintiff upon Defendant's death has been called 
7The Court should note that Plaintiff failed to cite to the record to show this Court that her 
argument was preserved in the trial court. 
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into question. Moreover, even if the Agreement were invalid for some reason, the Plaintiffs 
conveyance was memorialized in a Quit Claim Deed, duly executed and acknowledged by the 
Plaintiff in accordance with the provisions of the Utah Code dealing with deeds. Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-1-13. The deed need not as a matter of law comply with the execution provisions 
of the probate code. The Deed itself was a binding, enforceable, recordable instrument 
conveying present title to Defendant as a matter of law. Plaintiffs argument must be rejected. 
VII. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO HIS ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL. 
The District Court ordered that each party bear his or her own costs and 
attorney's fees in this action. Defendant is entitled to an award of his reasonable attorney's 
fees and costs on appeal because Plaintiffs appeal is frivolous. It has long been the rule of 
this Court that where an appellant in a domestic action must bear the expense of defending a 
frivolous appeal, he is entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal. Burt v. Burt, 799 
P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App. 1990); Hurt v. Hurt, 793 P.2d 948, 951 (Utah App. 1990); Porco 
v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 (Utah App. 1988). Here, Plaintiff/Appellant has not raised a single 
argument of substance or merit. Defendant should prevail on each issue appealed. Therefore, 
Defendant is entitled to his reasonable attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
On the other hand, Plaintiff was not awarded attorney's fees below. In order to 
be entitled to an award of fees on appeal, she must present a "well-supported claim of 
changed circumstances." Burt, 799 P.2d at 1171. She has failed to meet her burden of 
showing a significant change in circumstances and therefore is not entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees on appeal. 
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Under Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-3, the award of attorney's fees in a 
divorce action is discretionary with the District Court. Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 
(Utah App. 1989). Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the District Court made a clear, 
prejudicial abuse of discretion in declining to award attorney's fees to any party. The District 
Court's finding that Plaintiff can take care of herself is not clearly erroneous. Plaintiff 
currently owns real estate with a present market value in excess of $240,000 (after deducting 
Defendant's $26,224 interest) and future rental income therefrom for the foreseeable future. 
She is employed part-time and employable full-time. She can bear her own attorney's fees 
and costs. 
If anything, the District Court erred in not awarding attorney's fees to 
Defendant. The parties' Agreement, which the District Court properly upheld and enforced, 
the parties agreed that in any dispute regarding the Agreement, the breaching party would be 
responsible to pay the non-breaching attorneys' fees and costs. Nevertheless, the District 
Court declined to award Defendant his attorneys' fees and costs, finding simply that 
Defendant had the ability to pay his own fees. The District Court certainly did not err in 
declining to award Plaintiff her fees and costs, especially in light of Plaintiff's contractual 
obligation to pay Defendant's fees. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Amended Decree of Divorce should be affirm* 
every respect and Appellee should be awarded his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred in defending this appeal. 
DATED this 3/Vdav of June 1997. 
PARRY LAWRENCE & WARD 
BRENT D. WARD, Esq. 
BRET F. RANDALL, Esq. 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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culations. 
Section 
78-45*7.9. Joint physical custody — Obli-
gation calculations. 
78-45-7.10. Reduction when child becomes 
18. 
78-45-7.11. Reduction for extended visita-
tion. 
78-45-7.12. Income in excess of tables. 
78-45-7.13. Advisory committee — Member-
ship and functions — Per 
diem and expenses. 
78-4^-7.14. Base combined child support ob-
ligation table and low income 
table. 
78-45-7.15. Medical expenses. 
78-45-7.16. Child care expenses — Ex-
penses not incurred. 
78-45-7.17. Child care costs. 
78-45-7.18. Limitation on amount of sup-
port ordered. 
78-45-7.19. Determination of parental li-
78-45-7.20. Accountability of support pro-
vided to benefit child — Ac-
counting. 
78-45-7.21. Award of tax exemption for de-
pendent children. 
78-45-8. Continuing jurisdiction. 
78-45-9. Enforcement of right of support. 
78-45-9.1. Repealed. 
78-45-9.2. County attorney to assist obli-
gee. 
78-45-10. Appeals. 
78-45-11. Husband and wife privileged 
communication inapplicable 
— Competency of spouses. 
78-45-12. Rights are in addition to those 
presently existing. 
78-45-13. Interpretation and construc-
tion. 
78-45-1. Short title. 
This act may be cited as the Uniform Civil liability for Support Act. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 1. 
Meaning of "this act" — The term Itjhis 
act,* as used in this section, means Laws 1957, 
ch. 110, which enacted §§ 78-45-1 to 78-45-4, 
78-45-5 to 78-45-7, 78-45-8, 78-45-9, and 78-
45-10 to 78-45-13. 
Uniform Laws. — Other jurisdictions 
adopting the Uniform Civil Liability for Sup-
port Act are Maine and New Hampshire. 
Cross-References. — Income withholding, 
§§ 62A-11-401 to 62A-11-414. 
public support of children, § 62A-11-301 et 
sea* 
Uniform child custody jurisdiction, Chapter 
45c of this title. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Note, decree have been fulfilled, 43 A.L.R.4th 953. 
J.W& v. Schoolcraft: The Husband's Rights to Modern status of views as to validity of 
His Wife's Illegitimate Child Under Utah Law, premarital agreements contemplating divorce 
1989 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 955. or separation, 53 A.L.R.4th 22. 
AXJL — Postmajority disability as reviving Enforceability of premarital agreements gov-
parental duty to support child, 48 A.L.R.4th eming support or property rights upon divorce 
919. or separation as affected by circumstances sur-
Child support: court's authority to reinstitute rounding execution — modern status, 53 
parent's support obligation after terms of prior A.L.R.4th 85. 
78-45-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Adjusted gross income" means income calculated under Subsection 
78-45-7.6(1). 
(2) "Administrative agency" means the Office of Recovery Services. 
(3) "Base child support award" means the award that may be ordered 
and is calculated using the guidelines before additions for medical ex-
penses and work-related child care costs. 
(4) "Base combined child support obligation table," "child support 
table," "base child support obligation table," "low income table," or "table" 
means the appropriate table in Section 78-45-7.14. 
(5) "Child" means a son or daughter younger than 18 years of age and 
a son or daughter of any age who is incapacitated from earning a living 
and is without sufficient means. 
(6) "Court" means the district court, juvenile court, or administrative 
agency which may enter a child support order as defined in Section 
62A-11-401. 
(7) "Earnings" means compensation paid or payable for personal ser-
vices, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or 
otherwise, and specifically includes periodic payment pursuant to pension 
or retirement programs, or insurance policies of any type. Earnings 
specifically includes all gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both 
combined, including profit gained through sale or conversion of capital 
assets. 
(8) "Guidelines" means the child support guidelines in Sections 78-45-
7.2 through 78-45-7-21. 
(9) "IV-D* means Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 
601 et seq. 
(10) "Joint physical custody19 means the child stays with each parent 
overnight for more than 25% of the year, and both parents contribute to 
the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support. 
(11) "Medical expenses" means health and dental expenses and related 
insurance costs. 
(12) "Obligee" means any person to whom a duty of support is owed. 
(13) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support. 
(14) "Office" means the Office of Recovery Services within the Depart-
ment of Human Services. 
(15) "Parent" includes a natural parent, an adoptive parent, or a 
stepparent. 
(16) "Split custody" means that each parent has physical custody of at 
least one of the children. 
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(17) "State* includes any state, territory, or possession of the United 
States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(18) "Stepchild" means any child having a stepparent. 
(19) "Stepparent" means a person ceremonially married to a child's 
natural or adoptive custodial parent who is not the child's natural or 
adoptive parent or a person living with the natural or adoptive parent as 
a common law spouse, whose common law marriage was entered into in 
this state under Section 30-1-4.5 or in any other state which recognizes the 
validity of common law marriages. 
(20) "Work-related child care costs" means reasonable child care costs 
for up to a full-time work week or training schedule as necessitated by the 
employment or training otthe custodial parent under Section 78-45-7.17. 
(21) "Worksheets" means the forms used to aid in calculating the base 
child support award. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 2; 1979, ch. 
131, § 1; 1982, ch. 63, § 1; 1989, ch. 214,5 2; 
1990, ch. 100, § 1; 1994, ch. 118, § 1; 1994, 
ch. 140, § 13. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment by ch. 140, effective May 2, 1994, added 
the definition of "office" and redesignated the 
other subsections accordingly. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 118, effective 
July 1, 1994, added Subsections (2), (6), (9), 
(11), and (20) and redesignated the remaining 
subsections accordingly; in Subsection (3), in-
serted "that may be ordered and is" and deleted 
"uninsured* before "medical expenses"; in Sub-
section (4) inserted "base child support obliga-
tion table," "low income table," and "appropri-
ate"; in Subsection (8), substituted "78-45-7.21" 
for "78-45-7.18"; deleted former Subsection (15) 
which defined "total child support award"; and 
made stylistic changes. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Federal Law. - Title IV-D of the federal 
Social Security Act is codified as 42 U.S.C. 
§ 651 et seq. 
Cross-References. — Adoption, Chapter 30 
of this title. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS and, thus, the court was required to follow the 
mandate of the child support guidelines and 
use the joint custody child support worksheet 
or make findings of fact justifying its deviation. 
Udy v. Udy, 893 R2d 1097 (Utah Ct App. 1995). 
Cited in Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909 
(Utah C t App. 1988); Asper v. Asper, 753 P.2d 
978 (Utah C t App. 1988); Ball v. Peterson, 912 
R2d 1006 (Utah C t App. 1996). 
Joint physical custody. 
Cited. 
Joint physical custody. 
Courtordered visitation that included a total 
of over 120 overnight stays per year, plus addi-
tional visitation days, exceeded the threshold 
for joint physical custody under Subsection (10) 
78-45-3. Duty of man. 
(1) Every father shall support his child; and every man shall support his 
wife when she is in need. 
(2) Except as limited in a court order under Section 30-3-5, 30-4-3, or 
78-45-7.15: 
(a) The expenses incurred on behalf of a minor child for reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses, and other necessities are charge-
able upon the property of both parents, regardless of the marital status of 
the parents. 
(b) Either or both parents may be sued by a creditor for the expenses 
described in Subsection (2Xa) incurred on behalf of minor children. 
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History: L. 1957, ch. 110, $ 3; 1977, ch. 
140,§ 3; 1991, ch. 143, ft 1; 1995, ch. 175, ft 3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1,1995, added Subsection 
(2). 
Cross-References. — Criminal nonsupport 
of children, ft 76-7-201. 
Divorce, maintenance of parties, ft 30-3-5. 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Act, ft 77-31-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Cause of action for support. 
—Jurisdiction. 
Child's right to support. 
Duty to support children. 
—Judicial limitation. 
— Handicapped child. 
—Transfer. 
Duty to support wife. 
—Termination. 
Divorce. 
Estoppel to assert duty to support. 
Wrongful death action. 
— Medical and burial expenses. 
Cited. 
Cause of act ion for s u p p o r t 
A minor child, via her guardian ad litem, has 
standing to maintain a cause of action against 
her father for support. Fauver v. Hansen, 803 
R2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
—Jurisdiction. 
In a proceeding on a petition by the guardian 
and conservator for a child, appointed following 
the death of the custodial parent, the trial 
court's jurisdiction over the surviving parent 
arose not from the original divorce decree, but 
rather from the petition to enforce the support 
obligation of the parent. Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 
R2d 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Child's right to support 
A child's right to support is his own right, not 
his parent's. Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 R2d 
895 (Utah 1976). 
A surviving parent's obligation, of support 
existed at the time of the custodial parent's 
death, regardless of whether a guardian and 
conservator had legal custody; thus, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in retroac-
tively applying a support order back to the date 
of the custodial parent's death. Jensen v. 
Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah Ct App. 1995). 
Duty to support children. 
—Judicial limitation. 
Parents are permanently "duty-bound" to 
support their children; however, the extent of 
that duty is not without limitation, and where 
the question of child support has been submit-
ted to a court of competent jurisdiction and a 
ruling thereon has been obtained, the more 
general statutory duty of support becomes cir-
cumscribed by the more specific duly imposed 
by the court. In re C J.U., 660 R2d 237 (Utah 
1983). 
—Handicapped child. 
Trial court properly required husband to pay 
child support after the child reached 21 years of 
age where the child was retarded and incapable 
of self-support. Garrand v. Garrand, 615 P.2d 
422 (Utah 1980). 
—Transfer. 
A parent cannot rid himself of his duty to 
support his children by purporting to transfer 
this duty to someone else by contract. Gulley v. 
Gulley, 570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977). 
Duty to suppor t wife. 
— Termination. 
Divorce. 
Divorce terminates husband's duty to sup-
port his wife except for any obligations imposed 
by the divorce decree. Gulley v. Gulley, 570 P.2d 
127 (Utah 1977). 
Estoppel to asser t duty to support . 
Children have a right to support, but where 
their mother and her second husband had pro-
vided it, mother was estopped to demand that 
her first husband also contribute support; since 
her demand was not in the nature of a claim for 
reimbursement, to grant it would have been in 
effect to give the children 'double support" to 
which they were not entitled. Wasescha v. 
Wasescha, 548 R2d 895 (Utah 1976). 
Wrongful death action. 
—Medical and burial expenses. 
District court erred in deducting proceeds of 
medical and burial insurance policy from 
amount of special damages in action by father 
for wrongful death of son, since father was 
under legal duty imposed by statute to pay cost 
of medical care and burial expenses for son and 
was thus entitled to recover amounts reason-
ably expended for that purpose; mere fact that 
plaintiff at own expense carried insurance to 
protect against such contingencies should not 
inure to benefit of wrongdoer. Ottley v. Hill, 21 
Utah 2d 896, 446 P.2d 301 (1968). 
Cited in Race v. Race, 740 P.2d 258 (Utah 
1987). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments — 
Family Law, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 273. 
From Guesswork to Guidelines—The Adop-
tion of Uniform Child Support Guidelines in 
Utah, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 859. 
Am. Jur. 2d* — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband and 
Wife § 329 et seq.; 69 Am. Jur. 2d Parent and 
Child § 54. 
C JJ&. - 41 C J.S. Husband and Wife § 48; 
67A C.J.S. Parent and Child §§ 55 to 58. 
AJLR. — Death of putative father as pre-
cluding action for determination of paternity or 
for child support, 58 A.L.R.3d 188. 
Liability of parent for support of child insti-
tutionalized by juvenile court, 59 A.L.R.3d 636. 
Sexual partner's tort liability to other part-
ner for fraudulent misrepresentation regarding 
sterility or use of birth control resulting in 
pregnancy, 2 A.L.R.5th 301. 
Parent's child support liability as affected by 
other parent's fraudulent misrepresentation re-
garding sterility or use of birth control, or 
refusal to abort pregnancy, 2 AL.R.5th 337. 
Key Numbers* — Husband and Wife «» 4; 
Parent and Child «=» 3.1(2). 
78-45-4. Duty of woman. 
(1) Every woman shall support her child; and she shall support her husband 
when he is in need. 
(2) Except as limited in a court order under Section 30-3-5, 30-4-3, or 
78-45-7.15: 
(a) The expenses incurred on behalf of a minor child for reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses, and other necessities are charge-
able upon the property of both parents, regardless of the marital status of 
the parents. 
(b) Either or both parents may be sued by a creditor for the expenses 
described in Subsection (2Xa) incurred on behalf of minor children. 
History: L. 1957, ch, 110, § 4; 1995, ch* Cross-References. — Criminal nonsupport 
175, § 4. of children, § 76-7-201. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- Divorce, maintenance of parties, § 30-3-5. 
ment, effective May 1,1995, added Subsection Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
(2). Act, § 77-31-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Duty to support children. 
—Judicial limitation. 
—Transfer. 
—Termination. 
Divorce. 
Cited. 
Duly to support children* 
—Judicial limitation* 
Parents are Muty-bound* to support their 
children; however, the extent of that duty is not 
without limitation, and where the question of 
child support has been submitted to a court of 
competent jurisdiction and a ruling thereon has 
been obtained, the more general statutory duty 
of support becomes circumscribed by the more 
specific duty imposed by the court In re C.J.U., 
660 P.2d 237 (Utah 1983). 
—Transfer. 
A parent cannot rid herself of her duty to 
support her children by purporting to transfer 
this duty to someone else by contract. Gulley v. 
ChiUey, 570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977). 
—Termination* 
Divorce. 
The fact that the wife in a divorce proceeding 
is not required to pay support, neither termi-
nates the children's right, nor obviates the 
mother's responsibility, for such support as 
may be determined at some future time. Wood-
ward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985). 
Cited in Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547 (Utah 
CtApp. 1993). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — From Guesswork to 
Guidelines—The Adoption of Uniform Child 
Support Guidelines in Utah, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 
859. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband and 
Wife § 334; 69 Am. Jur. 2d Parent and Child 
§ 54. 
C.J.S. - 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 48; 
67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 54. 
AJLR. — Liability of parent for support of 
child institutionalized by juvenile court, 59 
A.L.R.3d 636. 
Wife's possession of independent means as 
affecting her right to child support pendente 
lite,60A.L.R.3d832. 
Sexual partner's tort liability to other part-
ner for fraudulent misrepresentation regarding 
sterility or use of birth control resulting in 
pregnancy, 2 A.L.R.5th 801. 
Parent*8 child support liability as affected by 
other parent's fraudulent misrepresentation re-
garding sterility or use of birth control, or 
refusal to abort pregnancy, 2 A.L.R.5th 337. 
Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife «» 4; 
Parent and Child «=* 3.1(3). 
78-45-4.1. Duty of stepparent to support stepchild — Ef-
fect of termination of marriage or common law 
relationship. 
A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the same extent that a natural or 
adoptive parent is required to support a child. Provided, however, that upon 
the termination of the marriage or common law relationship between the 
stepparent and the child's natural or adoptive parent the support obligation 
shall terminate. 
History: C, 1953, 78-46-4.1, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 131, § 2; 1980, ch. 42, § 1. 
Cross-References. — Adoption, Chapter 30 
of this title. 
Divorce, maintenance of parties, § 30-3-5. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Equitable estoppel. 
Cited. 
Equitable estoppel* 
Since courts are reluctant to use an equitable 
estoppel theory to impose a support obligation 
on a man who is not the biological father of a 
child, a stepfather was not equitably estopped 
from denying liability where there was no evi-
dence that the mother had attempted to collect 
support from the natural father, even though 
the stepfather had married the mother prior to 
the child's birth, and at one time had claimed 
the child as his own. Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 
700 (Utah 1985). 
Cited in Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006 
(Utah CtApp. 1996). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — From Guesswork to 
Guidelines—The Adoption of Uniform Child 
Support Guidelines in Utah, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 
859. 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note, 
Wiese v. Vfiese: Support Obligations of Steppar-
ents — The Utah Supreme Court Toppled by 
Estoppel, 12 J. Contemp. L. 806 (1987). 
AXJL — Stepparents postdivorce duty to 
support stepchild, 44 AXiL4th 520. 
Parental rights of man who is not biological 
or adoptive father of child but was husband or 
cohabitant of mother when child was conceived 
or born, 84 A.L.R.4th 655. 
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78-45-4.2. Natural or adoptive parent has primary obliga-
tion of support — Right of stepparent to recover 
support. 
Nothing contained herein shall act to relieve the natural parent or adoptive 
parent of the primary obligation of support; furthermore, a stepparent has the 
same right to recover support for a stepchild from the natural or adoptive 
parent as any other obligee. 
History: C. 1963, 78-45-4-2, enacted by L. Income withholding, §§ 62A-11-401 to 62A-
1979, ch. 131, S 3. 11-414. 
Cross-References* — Adoption, Chapter 30 
of this title. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cause of action for support her father for support. Fauver v. Hansen, 803 
A minor child, via her guardian ad litem, has P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
standing to maintain a cause of action against 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note, ents — The Utah Supreme Court Tbppled by 
Wiese v. Wiese: Support Obligations of Steppar- Estoppel, 12 J. Contemp. L. 305 (1987). 
78-45-4*3. Ward of state — Primary obligation to support. 
Notwithstanding Section 78-45-2, a natural or an adoptive parent or 
stepparent whose minor child has become a ward of the state is not relieved of 
the primary obligation to support that child until he reaches the age of 
majority. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-4.3, enacted by L. Period of minority, § 15-2-1. 
1983, ch. 120, § 1. 
Cross-References. — Adoption, Chapter 30 
of this title. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Ball v. Peterson, 912 R2d 1006 
(Utah Ct App. 1996). 
78-45-5. Duly of obligor regardless of presence or resi-
dence of obligee. 
An obligor present or resident in this state has the duty of support as defined 
in this act regardless of the presence or residence of the obligee. 
History: L. 1957, oh. 110, { 5. 
Meaning of "this act." — See note under 
same catchline following § 78-45-1. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Desertion and Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife *=> 4; 
Nonsupport §§ 32, 95. Parent and Child «=» 3.1(5). 
78-45-6. District court jurisdiction. 
The district court shall have jurisdiction of all proceedings brought under 
this act. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, 5 6. Meaning of "this act.* — See note under 
Cross-References. — General jurisdiction same catchline following § 78-45-1. 
of district court, § 78-3-4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Applicability. arose not from the original divorce decree, but 
In a proceeding on a petition by the guardian rather from the petition to enforce the support 
and conservator for a child, appointed following obligation of the parent. Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 
the death of the custodial parent, the trial R2d 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
court's jurisdiction over the surviving parent 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 147 
et seq. 
Key Numbers. — Courts «=> 156. 
78-45-7. Determination of amount of support — Rebut-
table guidelines. 
(1) (a) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior 
court order unless there has been a material change of circumstance on 
the part of the obligor or obligee. 
(b) If the prior court order contains a stipulated provision for the 
automatic adjustment for prospective support, the prospective support 
shall be the amount as stated in the order, without a showing of a material 
change of circumstances, if the stipulated provision: 
(i) is clear and unambiguous; 
(ii) is self-executing; 
(iii) provides for support which equals or exceeds the base child 
support award required by the guidelines; and 
(iv) does not allow a decrease in support as a result of the obligor's 
voluntary reduction of income. 
(2) If no prior court order exists, or a material change in circumstances has 
occurred, the court determining the amount of prospective support shall 
require each party to file a proposed award of child support using the 
guidelines before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing 
award may be granted. 
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court 
shall establish support after considering all relevant factors, including but not 
limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
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(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child; 
(f) the ages of the parties; and 
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of 
others. 
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess all 
arrearages based upon the Uniform Child Support Guidelines described in this 
chapter. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, 5 ?5 1977, ch. 
145, § 10; 1984, ch. 13, § 2; 1989, ch. 214,5 3; 
1990, ch. 100, S 2; 1994, ch. 118, § 2; 1994, 
ch. 140, § 14. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment by ch. 140, effective May 2,1994, substi-
tuted "the Uniform Child Support Guidelines 
described in this chapter" for *but not limited 
to: (a) the amount of public assistance received 
by the obligee, if any; and (b) the funds that 
have been reasonably and necessarily ex-
pended in support of spouse and children" at 
the end of Subsection (4). 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 118, effective 
Juljrl, 1994, designated former Subsection (1) 
as Subsection (lXa) and added Subsection 
(1Kb). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Cross-References. — Creation of Depart-
ment of Human Services, § 62A-1-102. 
Creation of Judicial Council, Utah Const., 
Art. VIII, Sec. 12; § 78-3-21. 
Divorce, maintenance of parties, § 30-3-5. 
Public support of children, § 62A-11-301 et 
seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Amount of award. 
Assessment of arrearages. 
— Due process requirements. 
— Joint physical custody. 
Factors considered. 
— Wealth of party's parents. 
Findings of fact. 
Modification of support. 
—Application of guidelines. 
— Change in circumstances. 
—Divorce decree. 
State recovery of assistance to child. 
Cited. 
Amount of award. 
Award to wife of $300 per month per child 
was an abuse of discretion, in light of the 
disparity between the wife's monthly gross in-
come, $1,033, and the husband's, $8,333; award 
was therefore increased to $600 per month per 
child. Martinez v. Martinez, 764 P.2d 69 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988), rev*d on other grounds, 818 R2d 
538 (Utah 1991). 
Assessment of arrearages. 
— Due process requirements* 
Due process of law requires that court must 
consider the relevant factors set out in this 
section in assessment of obligor for public as-
sistance benefits received by the obligee prior to 
a court order for support Roberts v. Roberts, 
592 R2d 697 (Utah 1979). 
— Joint physical custody. 
Court-ordered visitation that included a total 
of over 120 overnight stays per year, plus addi-
tional visitation days, exceeded the threshold 
for joint physical custody under § 78-45-2(10) 
and, thus, the court was required to follow the 
mandate of the child support guidelines and 
use the joint custody child support worksheet 
or make findings of fact justifying its deviation. 
Udy v. Udy, 893 P.2d 1097 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Factors considered* 
—Wealth of party's parents. 
The plaintiff argued the wealth of the defen-
dants parents, who made large gifts of money 
to the defendant during the marriage, should 
have been considered by the trial court. Such a 
consideration would have been tantamount to 
imputing the wealth and income of her parents 
to the defendant, and thereby imposing a duty 
of child support on the grandparents. Such a 
result would have been contrary to the concepts 
of parental duty and common sense. Ebbert v. 
Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Utah a . App. 1987), 
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
Findings of fact. 
The trial court's failure to make explicit find-
ings regarding the statutory factors pertinent 
in a child support determination requires re-
mand to the trial court. Stevens v. Stevens, 754 
P.2d 952 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
This section requires the trial court to con-
sider at least the seven factors listed therein. 
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Further, those factors constitute material is-
sues upon which the trial court must enter 
findings of fact. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 
909 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Where the court orders a party to pay child 
support to a child who has reached the age of 
majority but is nevertheless entitled to support 
under § 78-45-2, the court must enter specific 
findings of fact on each of the factors set forth in 
this section. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Case was remanded for proper child support 
findings, where findings of the parties, incomes 
were insufficient to support an award of child 
support. Bake v. Bake, 772 P.2d 461 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
Trial court's findings were inadequate that 
merely noted a "dramatic* increase in the fa-
ther's income and a "substantial" decline in the 
mother's health, and set the award at $200 per 
month per child. Ostler v. Ostler, 789 R2d 713 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Modification of support . 
— Application of guidelines. 
The trial court committed reversible error 
when it failed to apply the presumptive guide-
lines set forth in this chapter and determined 
child support outside the guidelines without 
finding there were special circumstances that 
justified deviation. Hill v. Hill, 841 P.2d 722 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
— Change in circumstances. 
Factors other than a change in relative in-
come affecting the child support calculation can 
constitute a material change in circumstances 
allowing the court, on a modification petition, 
to reach the issue of whether a deviation from 
the guidelines is now appropriate. Significant 
changes in the factual circumstances of the 
child, such as special education or health needs, 
which, if in existence at the time of the original 
decree, would have permitted an upward devia-
tion from the guidelines in a modification pro-
ceeding. Nunley v. Brooks, 881 R2d 955 (Utah 
a . App. 1994). 
— Divorce decree* 
The divorce decree establishes the duly of 
support the ex-husband owes to his ex-wife and 
a complaint under this section to modify that 
duty of support is improper. Mecham v. 
Mecham, 570 P.2d 123 (Utah 1977). 
Plaintiff was required to file a petition to 
modify her divorce decree under Rule 6-404 of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration when 
she sought to enforce, by order to show cause, a 
provision in the decree that provided that fu-
ture child support would be automatically ad-
justed to reflect changes in income. Such a 
provision violates Subsection (1) of this section, 
which provides that a child support order can 
only be modified based upon a showing of a 
material change in circumstances. Grover v. 
Grover, 839 P.2d 871 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
State recovery of assis tance to child. 
State, which was joined as a party to the 
divorce action before court entered order deter-
mining husband's obligation for child support, 
was entitled to reimbursement from the hus-
band for assistance furnished the child before 
entry of the order for support in the amount, 
based upon the relevant factors as set out in 
this section, as set out in the support order. 
Roberts v. Roberts, 592 P.2d 597 (Utah 1979). 
Cited in Kelly v. Draney, 754 P.2d 92 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988); Johnson v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 
696 (Utah C t App. 1989); Proctor v. Proctor, 
773 R2d 1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Moon v. 
Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990); Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review* — Note, New Standards 
for Child Support Enforcement in Utah, 1986 
Utah L. Rev. 691. 
From Guesswork to Guidelines—The Adop-
tion of Uniform Child Support Guidelines in 
Utah, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 859. 
Am. Jar. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband and 
Wife § 330 et seq.; 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent and 
Child § 54 et seq. 
AXJL — Loss of income due to incarceration 
as affecting child support obligation, 27 
AI*R.6th640. 
CJFJ3. - 41 CJ .S . Husband and Wife § 48 et 
seq.; 67A CJJ3. Parent and Child § 50. 
Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife *=» 4; 
Parent and Child «=» 3.1(5). 
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78-45-7.1. Medical expenses of dependent children — As-
signing responsibility for payment — Insurance 
coverage — Income withholding. 
The court shall include the following in its order: 
(1) a provision assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable 
and necessary medical expenses for the dependent children; 
(2) a provision requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate 
insurance for the medical expenses of dependent children, if coverage is or 
becomes available at a reasonable cost; 
(3) provisions for income withholding, in accordance with Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and 
(4) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after 
January 1, 1994, that are subject to income withholding, an order 
assessing against the obligor an additional $7 per month check processing 
fee to be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of 
Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services for the 
purposes of income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, 
Parts 4 and 5. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.1, enacted by L. made several stylistic changes in Subsections 
1984, ch. 13, § 3; 1990, ch. 166, § 3; 1993, ch. (1) and (2); and added Subsections (3) and (4) 
261, § 12; 1994, ch. 118, § 3. The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend- deleted aand dental" after "medical" in Subsec-
ment, effective January 1, 1994, rewrote the tion (1) and deleted "health, hospital, and den-
undesignated introductory paragraph, which tal care" after "appropriate" and inserted 
read "When no prior court order exists or the "medical expenses" in Subsection (2). 
prior court order makes no specific provision for Cross-References. - Divorce, maintenance 
the payment of medicrf and dental expenses for ^
 h e a l t h c a r e rf ^ § 3 0 . 3 . 5 
dependent children, the court m its order ; 
78-45-7.2* Application of guidelines — Rebuttal. 
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative order establishing 
or modifying an award of child support entered on or after July 1,1989. 
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable pre-
sumption in establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or 
permanent child support. 
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and consider-
ations required by the guidelines, the award amounts resulting from the 
application of the guidelines, and the use of worksheets consistent with 
these guidelines are presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under the 
provisions of this section. 
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the 
conclusion that complying with a provision of the guidelines or ordering an 
award amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappro-
priate, or not in the best interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to 
rebut the presumption in that case. 
(4) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who live in the home of 
that parent and are not children in common to both parties may at the 
option of either party be taken into account under the guidelines in setting 
or modifying a child support award, as provided in Subsection (5). 
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(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that compute the obliga-
tions of the respective parents for the additional children. The obligations 
shall then be subtracted from the appropriate parent's income before 
Tletermining the award in the instant case. 
(5) In a proceeding to modify an existing award, consideration of natural or 
adoptive children other than those in common to both parties may be applied 
to mitigate an increase in the award but may not be applied to justify a 
decrease in the award. 
(6) With regard to child support orders, enactment of the guidelines and any 
subsequent change in the guidelines constitutes a substantial or material 
change of circumstances as a ground for modification or adjustment of a court 
order, if there is a difference of at least 25% between the existing order and the 
guidelines. In cases enforced under IV-D of Title IV of the Social Security Act, 
42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., the office may request modification, in accor-
dance with the requirements of the Family Support Act of 1988, Public Law 
100-485, no more often than once every three years. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.2, enacted by L. 
1989, ch. 214, § 4; 1990, ch. 100, § 3; 1990, 
ch. 275, § 2; 1994, ch. 118, § 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1994, inserted "and the 
use of worksheets consistent with these guide-
lines" in Subsection (2Kb); in Subsection (6), 
inserted "or adjustment" in the first sentence 
and substituted I n cases enforced under IV-D 
of Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 
Section 601 et seq." for "With regard to IV-D 
ANALYSIS 
Modification of award. 
— Change in circumstances. 
Other children. 
Modification of award. 
When the parties had agreed to the amount 
of child support before the effective date of the 
child support guidelines, the trial court erred in 
modifying child support when no petition to 
modify had been filed and in modifying the 
support amount without finding that a material 
change of circumstances had occurred since the 
previous order had been entered. Bailey v. 
Adams, 798 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(applying Subsection (1Kb) of this section prior 
to 1990 amendment regarding impact of guide-
lines on existing support orders). 
The trial court committed reversible error 
when it failed to apply the presumptive guide-
lines set forth in this chapter and determined 
child support outside the guidelines without 
finding there were special circumstances that 
justified deviation. Hill v. Hill, 841 P.2d 722 
(Utah Ct App. 1992). 
— Change in circumstances. 
Factors other than a change in relative in-
cases" at the beginning of the second sentence; 
and made stylistic changes. 
Federal Law. — The Family Support Act of 
1988, Public Law 100-485, cited in Subsection 
(6), amended various sections throughout Title 
IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601 et 
seq. 
Effective Dates. - Laws 1989, ch. 214 
became effective on April 24,1989, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
come affecting the child support calculation can 
constitute a material change in circumstances 
allowing the court, on a modification petition, 
to reach the issue of whether a deviation from 
the guidelines is now appropriate. Significant 
changes in the factual circumstances of the 
child, such as special education or health needs, 
which, if in existence at the time of the original 
decree, would have permitted an upward devia-
tion from the guidelines in a modification pro-
ceeding. Nunley v. Brooks, 881 R2d 955 (Utah 
Ct App. 1994). 
In cases where the parties' monthly combined 
adjusted gross income exceeds the n ices t level 
specified in the statutory table, the court must 
decide whether there has been a substantial 
change in the circumstances based on the com-
mon law and may find a substantial change of 
circumstances warranting a modification of a 
child support award based solely on an increase 
in the obligor's income, which thereby enables 
him to provide greater support. Ball v. 
Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Other children. 
This section does not mandate that the trial 
court give credit for children living in the obli-
gee's current home; rather, the trial court has 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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the ability to determine whether or not other amount of support. Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 
children will be considered in determining the 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — From Guesswork to Support Guidelines in Utah, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 
Guidelines—The Adoption of Uniform Child 859. 
78-45-7.3. Procedure — Documentation — Stipulation. 
(1) In a default or uncontested proceeding, the moving party shall submit: 
(a) a completed child support worksheet; 
(b) the financial verification required by Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and 
(c) a written statement indicating whether or not the amount of child 
support requested is consistent with the guidelines. 
(2) (a) If the documentation of income required under Subsection (1) is not 
available, a verified representation of the defaulting party's income by the 
moving party, based on the best evidence available, may be submitted. 
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and may only be offered after 
a copy has been provided to the defaulting party in accordance with Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure or Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Proce-
dures Act, in an administrative proceeding. 
(3) (a) In a stipulated proceeding, one of the moving parties shall submit: 
(i) a completed child support worksheet; 
(ii) the financial verification required by Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); 
and 
(iii) a written statement indicating whether or not the amount of 
child support requested is consistent with the guidelines. 
(b) A hearing is not required, but the guidelines shall be used to review 
the adequacy of a child support order negotiated by the parents. 
(c) A stipulated amount for child support or combined child support and 
alimony is adequate under the guidelines if the stipulated child support 
amount or combined amount equals or exceeds the base child support 
award required by the guidelines. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.8, enacted by L. for "exceeds the total" and deleted the former 
1989, ch. 214, § 6; 1990, ch. 100, § 4; 1994, second sentence which read "When the stipu-
ch.118,5 6. lated amount exceeds the guidelines, it may be 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- awarded without a finding under Section 78-45-
ment, effective July 1, 1994, in Subsection 7.2." 
(SXc), substituted "equals or exceeds the base" 
78-45-7.4. Obligation — Adjusted gross income used. 
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating each parent's share of the 
base combined child support obligation. Only income of the natural or adoptive 
parents of the child may be used to determine the award under these 
guidelines. 
History: C. 1963, 78-45-7.4, enacted by L. ment, effective July 1,1994, substituted "base 
1989, ch. 214, fi 6; 1994, ch. 118, { 6. combined child support obligation" for "child 
Amendment Notes* — The 1994 amend- support award." 
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78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed in-
come. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, 
except under Subsection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, 
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, 
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, 
social security benefits, workers* compensation benefits, unemployment 
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from 
"nonmeans-tested" government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one 
full-time 40-hour job. However, if and only if during the time prior to the 
original support order, the parent normally and consistently worked more than 
40 hours at his job, the court may consider this extra time as a pattern in 
calculating the parent's ability to provide child support. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training 
Partnership Act, S.S.L, Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance; 
and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall 
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employ-
ment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses 
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to 
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to 
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the 
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross 
receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the 
amount of business income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual 
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly 
income. 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each 
parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and 
complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year unless the 
court finds, the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of 
income from records maintained by the Office of Employment Security 
may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax 
returns. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether 
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection 
(7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates 
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, 
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occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at 
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. Tb impute a 
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer 
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to 
the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children 
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can 
earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he 
cannot earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to 
establish basic job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the 
custodial parent's presence in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the 
subject of a child support award nor benefits to a child in the child's own 
right such as Supplemental Security Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a 
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning 
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation 
of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered as 
income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
History: (X 1953, 78-45-7^5, enacted by L. The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5; 1994, 1996, added "40-hour" and the second sentence 
ch, 118, § 7; 1996, ch. 171, $ 1. in Subsection (2). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective July 1,1994, rewrote Subsection 
(5Xb). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Deductible expenses. 
Findings by court 
Imputed income. 
Modification of award. 
Second job. 
Social Security benefits. 
Cited. 
Deductible expenses. 
The allocation of expenses cannot be dealt 
with as a matter of law under this section; the 
deductibility of particular expenses poses a 
question of fact, turning on whether such ex-
penses are necessary, and, if so, whether they 
exceed those required for the business's opera-
tion at a reasonable level. Bingham v. 
Bingham, 872 R2d 1065 (Utah Ct App. 1994). 
The trial court acted within its discretion in 
not deducting as "necessary expenses required 
for self-employment of business operation19 the 
father's small business taxes and his student 
loan obligations in calculating his gross income. 
Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah Ct App. 
1995). 
Findings by court. 
Although a trial court entered findings re-
quired by Subsection 7(b), since the trial court 
failed to enter any findings required under 
Subsection (7Xa), Hie findings on the whole 
were insufficient. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 
(Utah Ct App. 1993). 
Imputed income. 
Even though the court's findings of fact did 
not include a specific finding that ex-husband 
was underemployed, because he had acquiesced 
to the imputation of income at the trial level 
and because his job history and current employ-
ment options inarguably supported this impu-
tation, the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in imputing income in an amount greater 
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than the ex-husband's current salary. Hill v. 
Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Modification of award. 
When the parties had agreed to the amount 
of child support before the effective date of the 
child support guidelines, the trial court erred in 
modifying child support when no petition to 
modify had been filed and in modifying the 
support amount without finding that a material 
change of circumstances had occurred since the 
previous order had been entered. Bailey v. 
Adams, 798 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(applying § 78-45-7.2(lXb) prior to 1990 
amendment regarding impact of guidelines on 
existing support orders). 
Second job. 
The trial court's decision to consider the 
father's second source of income as part of his 
primary job was supported by the fact that both 
sources involved the performance of his profes-
sional duties as a physician. Jensen v. Bowcut, 
892 P.2d 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Social Security benefits. 
A trial court may, in its discretion, consider a 
child's receipt of Social Security benefits 
against the parent's child support obligation. 
A.LuR, — Attributing undisclosed income to 
parent or spouse for purposes of making child 
or spousal support award, 70 A.L.R.4th 173. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.6, enacted by L. 
1989, ch. 214, § & 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — The 
Economics of Divorce and Remarriage for Rural 
Utah Families, 17 J. Contemp. L. 301 (1990). 
However, a trial court may not order that those 
Social Security benefits be subject to legal pro-
cess. Nunley v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). 
In a proceeding on a petition by the guardian 
and conservator for a child, appointed following 
the death of the custodial parent, the trial court 
acted within its discretion in refusing to offset 
Social Security benefits paid to the child on the 
basis of the child's deceased mother's earning 
record. Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995). 
Social Security benefits made to minor chil-
dren as a result of obligor parent's disability 
may be credited toward that parent's ongoing 
child support obligation. Coulon v. Coulon, 915 
P.2d 1069 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Social Security benefit amounts paid to mi-
nor children, which exceed the court-ordered 
child support for the same period, may not be 
credited toward previously accrued child sup-
port arrearages. Coulon v. Coulon, 915 P.2d 
1069 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Cited in Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Cummings v. Cummings, 
821 P.2d 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
78-45-7.6. Adjusted gross income. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "adjusted gross income'' is the amount 
calculated by subtracting from gross income alimony previously ordered and 
paid and child support previously ordered. 
(2) The guidelines do not reduce the total child support award by adjusting 
the gross incomes of the parents for alimony ordered in the pending proceed-
ing. In establishing alimony, the court shall consider that in determining the 
child support, the guidelines do not provide a deduction from gross income for 
alimony 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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78-45-7.7. Calculation of obligations. 
(1) The parents' child support obligation shall be divided between them in 
proportion to their adjusted gross incomes, unless the low income table is 
applicable. 
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and split custody as defined in 
Section 78-45-2 and in cases where the obligor's adjusted gross income is 
$1,050 or less monthly, the base child support award shall be determined as 
follows: 
(a) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents and determine 
the base combined child support obligation using the base combined child 
support obligation table. 
(b) Calculate each parent's proportionate share of the base combined 
child support obligation by multiplying the combined child support obli-
gation by each parent's percentage of combined adjusted gross income. 
(3) In cases where the monthly adjusted gross income of the obligor is 
between $650 and $1,050, the base child support award shall be the lesser of 
the amount calculated in accordance with Subsection (2) and the amount 
calculated using the low income table. 
(4) The base combined child support obligation table provides combined 
child support obligations for up to six children. For more than six children, 
additional amounts may be added to the base child support obligation shown. 
Unless rebutted by Subsection 78-45-7.2(3), the amount ordered shall not be 
less than the amount which would be ordered for up to six children. 
(5) If the monthly adjusted gross income of the obligor is $649 or less, the 
court or administrative agency shall determine the amount of the child support 
obligation on a case-by-case basis, but the base child support award shall not 
be less than $20. 
(6) The amount shown on the table is the support amount for the total 
number of children, not an amount per child. 
History: C. 1953,78-46-7.7, enacted by L. tion of any monthly payments made directly by 
1989, ch* 214, § 9; 1990, cb. 100, § 6; 1994, each parent for medical and dental insurance 
ch. 118,5 8. premiums" at the end of Subsection (2Xb); de-
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- leted former Subsections (2Xc) and (2Xd) relat-
ment, effective July 1,1994, added "unless the ing to the calculation of the child support 
low income table is applicable" at the end of award; added present Subsections (3) and (5) 
Subsection (1); inserted "and in cases where the and redesignated the subsections accordingly; 
obligor's adjusted gross income is $1,050 or less in present Subsection (4), substituted "six chil-
monthly" and substituted "base" for "total" in dren» for "ten children" in two places, substi-
the introductory language of Subsection (2); tuted "may" for "shall" in the second sentence 
inserted "combined" the second time the word ^
 a<jded the third sentence; and made stylis-
appears in Subsection (2Xa); deleted "and sub- #c changes, 
tracting from the products the children's por-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS parent may be credited for insurance premiums 
paid by the children's stepparent. Ball v. 
Applicability Peterson, 912 R2d 1006 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Cited. 
Applicability. . 
This section does not address whether a o t*A p p # 1TOZ; ' 
Cited in Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Utah 
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78-45-7.8. Split custody — Obligation calculations. 
In cases of split custody, the base child support award shall be determined as 
follows: 
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents and determine 
the base combined child support obligation using the base combined child 
support obligation table. Allocate a portion of the calculated amount 
between the parents in proportion to the number of children for whom 
each parent has physical custody The amounts so calculated are a 
tentative base child support obligation due each parent from the other 
parent for support of the child or children for whom each parent has 
physical custody 
(2) Multiply the tentative base child support obligation due each parent 
by the percentage that the other parent's adjusted gross income bears to 
the total combined adjusted gross income of both parents. 
(3) Subtract the lesser amount in Subsection (2) from the larger amount 
to determine the base child support award to be paid by the parent with 
the greater financial obligation. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.8, enacted by L. deleted former Subsection (3) relating to sub-
1989, ch. 214, § 10; 1990, ch. 100, § 7; 1994, traction of payments for medical and dental 
ch. 118, § 9. insurance premiums; redesignated former Sub-
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- section (4) as Subsection (3); deleted former 
ment, effective July 1,1994, substituted "base" Subsections (5) and (6) relating to allocation of 
for "total" in the introductory language; in- combined monthly work related child care costs 
serted "combined" the second time the word and calculation of the total child support 
appears in the first sentence of Subsection (1); award; and made stylistic changes. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
78-45-7.9. Joint physical custody — Obligation calcula-
tions. 
In cases of joint physical custody, the base child support award shall be 
determined as follows: 
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents and determine 
the base combined child support obligation using tike base combined child 
support obligation table. 
(2) Calculate each parent's proportionate share of the base combined 
child support obligation by multiplying the base combined child support 
obligation by each parent's percentage of combined adjusted grosslncome. 
The amounts so calculated are a tentative base child support obligation 
due from each parent for support of the children. 
(3) Multiply each parent's tentative base child support obligation by the 
percentage of time the children spend with the other parent to determine 
each parent's tentative obligation to the other parent. 
(4) Calculate the base child support award to be paid by the obligor by 
subtracting the lesser amount calculated in Subsection (3) from the larger 
amount. 
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(5) The parent determined to be the obligor in Subsection (4) shall pay 
the amount calculated in Subsection (4) when the obligee has physical 
custody. 
History: C. 1958,78-45-7«9, enacted by L. made for medical and dental insurance premi-
198$, ch, 214, $ 11; 1980, ch. 100, % ft; 1904, UXHB; redesignated former Subsection (&) as 
ch. 118, § 10* Subsection (4); deleted former Subsection (6) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- relating to allocation of the combined work 
ment, effective July 1,1994, substituted •base* related child care cost of the parents; redesig-
for "total* in the introductory language; in- nated former Subsection (7) as Subsection (5) 
serted "combined* the second time the word and rewrote the provision; deleted former Sub-
appears in Subsection (1); inserted "base* the section (8) which read "Include the amounts 
second time the word appears in the first sen- determined in Subsections (7Xa) and (b) and 
tence of Subsection (2); deleted former Subsec- the two total child support awards in the child 
tion (4) relating to subtraction of payments support order*; and made stylistic changes. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Ball v. Peterson, 912 R2d 1006 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
78-45-7.10. Reduction when child becomes 18. 
(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age, or has graduated from high school 
during the child's normal and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs 
later, the base child support award is automatically reduced to reflect the lower 
base combined child support obligation shovm in the table for the remaining 
number of children due child support, unless otherwise provided in the child 
support order. 
(2) The award may not be reduced by a par child amount derived from the 
base child support award originally ordered. 
History: C.1968,78-45-7.10, enacted by L. graduated from high school during the child's 
1889, ch. 214, S 12; 1994, ch. 118, § 11. normal and expected year of graduation, which-
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- ever occurs later" and deleted "combined* be-
ment, effective July 1, 1994, inserted "or has fore "child support award" in Subsection (1). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 1006 (Utah Ct App. 1996). 
Construction. Retroactive modification. 
Retroactive modification. ^
 1 9 9 4 ^^oag^ to fl^ section, which 
Construction* added the alternative later date of reduction in 
This section requires that the automatic re- child support obligation, should not have been 
duction occur in the base combined child sup- applied to children who reached majority before 
port award, not in the total child support obli- the amendment took effect. Ball v. Peterson, 
gatton of one parent. Batt v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 912 P.2d 1W6 (Utah Ct. App. 1996>. 
78-45-7.11. Reduction for extended visitation. 
(1) The child support order shall provide that the base child support award 
be reduced by 50% for each child for time periods during which the child is with 
the noncustodial parent by order of the court or by written agreement of the 
parties for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. If the dependent child is a 
recipient of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, any agreement by the 
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parties for reduction of child support during extended visitation shall be 
approved by the administrative agency. However, normal visitation and 
holiday visits to the custodial parent shall not be considered an interruption of 
the-consecutive day requirement. 
(2) For purposes of this section the per child amount to which the abatement 
applies shall be calculated by dividing the base child support award by the 
number of children included in the award. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.11, enacted by L. of any 30 consecutive days" at the end of the 
1989, ch. 214, § 13; 1990, ch. 100, fi 9; 1994, first sentence and substituted the second and 
ch. 118, 5 12. third sentences for "Only the base child support 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- award is affected by the 50% abatement. The 
ment, effective July 1, 1994, in Subsection (1), amount to be paid for work related child care 
substituted the language beginning "which the costs may be suspended if the costs are not 
child is* for "which the order grants specific incurred during the extended visitation." 
extended visitation for that child for at least 25 
78-45-7.12. Income in excess of tables. 
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the highest level specified in 
the table, an appropriate and just child support amount shall be ordered on a 
case-by-case basis, but the amount ordered may not be less than the highest 
level specified in the table for the number of children due support. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.12, enacted by L. ment, effective July 1,1994, substituted "shall" 
1989, ch. 214, § 14; 1994, ch. 118, § 13. for "may* and inserted "on a case-by-case ba-
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- sis." 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS table alone is not enough; strict reliance on 
linear extrapolation would be erroneous, be-
Fact-finding.
 c a u g e t a k e n to ^ e x t r e m e > a c h i l d could be 
awarded support vastly exceeding any reason-
Fact-finding, able need. Ball v. Peterson, 912 R2d 1006 (Utah 
In cases where the parties' income exceeds Ck App. 1996). 
the highest monthly combined adjusted gross _. . , . _, . -, ,
 occ 0 0 , K>in m^u 
income listed on the statutory table, linear Cited in Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540 (Utah 
78-45-7.13. Advisory committee — Membership and func-
tions — Per diem and expenses. 
(1) On or before March 1, 1995, the governor shall appoint an advisory 
committee consisting of: 
(a) two representatives recommended by the Office of Recovery Ser-
vices; 
(b) two representatives recommended by the Judicial Council; 
(c) two representatives recommended by the Utah State Bar Associa-
tion; and 
(d) an uneven number of additional persons, not to exceed five, who 
represent diverse interests related to child support issues, fits the governor 
may consider appropriate. However, none of the individuals appointed 
under this subsection may be members of the Utah State Bar Association. 
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(2) (a) Except as required by Subsection (b), as terms of current committee 
members expire, the governor shall appoint each new member or reap-
pointed member to a four-year term. 
(b) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection (a), the governor 
shall, at the time of appointment or reappointment, adjust the length of 
terms to ensure that the terms of committee members are staggered so 
that approximately half of the committee is appointed every two years. 
(3) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any reason, the replace-
ment shall be appointed for the unexpired term. 
(4) (a) The advisory committee shall review the child support guidelines to 
ensure their application results in the determination of appropriate child 
support award amounts. 
(b) The committee shall report to the Legislative Judiciary Interim 
Committee on or before October 1 in 1989 and 1991, and then on or before 
October 1 of every fourth year subsequently. 
(c) The committee's report shall include recommendations of the major-
ity of the committee, as well as specific recommendations of individual 
members of the committee. 
(5) (a) (i) Members who are not government employees shall receive no 
compensation or benefits for their services, but may receive per diem 
and expenses incurred in the performance of the member's official 
duties at the rates established by the Division of Finance under 
Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107. 
(ii) Members may decline to receive per diem and expenses for their 
service, 
(b) (i) State government officer and employee members who do not 
receive salary, per diem, or expenses from their agency for their 
service may receive per diem and expenses incurred in the perfor-
mance of their official duties from the committee at the rates estab-
lished by the Division of Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 
63A-3-107. 
(ii) State government officer and employee members may decline to 
receive per diem and expenses for their service. 
(6) Staff for the committee shall be provided from the existing budgets of the 
Department of Human Services and the Judicial Council. 
(7) The committee ceases to exist no later than the date the subsequent 
committee under this section is appointed. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.13, enacted by L. 
1989, ch. 214, J 15; 1990, ch, 183, § 58; 1994, 
eh. 118,$ 14; 1996, ch. 243, $ 195. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted 
-March 1, 1995" for "May 1, 1989 and May 1, 
1991" and deleted "then on or before May 1 oF 
before "every fourth year" in the introductory 
language of Subsection (1). 
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 
1996, deleted "and every fourth year subse-
quently" after "March 1,1995" in the introduc-
tory language of Subsection (1); added Subsec-
tions (2) and (3); deleted former Subsection (3) 
which read: "The committee members serve 
without compensation0; added Subsection (5), 
and made appropriate redesignations of sub-
sections. 
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78-45-7.14. Base combined child support obligation table 
and low income table. 
an^f^w^co^Sbl^ ^  ^ ^ C M d 8 ^ H ^ ^ ™>l* 
BASE COMBINED CHILD SUPPORT OBUGATION TABLE 
(Both Parents) 
Monthly Combined 
Adj. Gross Income Number of Children 
1 2... 3 4 5 6 
From To 
fi?fi ~ tin i?o 184 191 198 200 201 
TO? ~ Ion }2 19° 198 205 207 209 
72fi ~ 7?n l?n i 9 7 205 212 214 216 ifi~ ™ U? Sf 212 2 2 ° 221 223 111 ~ lln }}n 2U 219 227 229 231 lm ~ 2£ HI 218 226 234 23<* 238 
«9fi ~ Ifn !ol 224 243 261 263 265 
2 £ " SS2 Joo 231 253 275 277 279 
ml " onn J!o 2 3 8 2 6 3 2 8 9 2»1 294 
£ ? " oS2 Jo! 245 274 303 3«5 308 926" Sn JS Si ^  316 319 322 S? ~ ra J>? 258 294 330 333 336 111 ~ 1 £5 J4?, 265 305 344 347 350 i ™ ? ~ J'S2n 146 272 315 558 361 364 
i'2£ ~ !'?™ 154 285 335 385 389 393 
i'?m ~ H22 161 299 356 413 417 421 
1,101 - 1,150 168 313 377 441 444 449 
1,151 - 1,200 176 326 387 449 454 So 
iS ' J iS JS I53 418 « " 49« « B 
i*?2i ~ H 5 198 367 «» 499 516 632 
J^S ~ H £ 2° 5 381 <« 615 537 656 
I'UJ " J'JS 2P 394 <« 632 558 680 
J'SJ ~ I'SS o«2 ^  478 549 679 605 
JnS" " J*5S P ^ 493 565 W0 629 
J'SJ " H?2 234 435 609 582 620 653 
1,601 - 1,650 242 449 524 699 641 677 
}'™~}'22 ^ 476 554 632 683 725 
1,751 - 1,800 264 489 569 649 704 749 
1,801 - 1,850 271 503 584 664 723 771 SE-ftX 2 517 697 ~ « ™ 
1 oS " J ™ 25 63° 61° 690 750 800 
1,951 - 2,000 293 544 622 700 752 81 q 
2,001 - 2,100 308 571 643 716 779 III 
2,101-2,200 319 592 S i ™ l™ g 
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Monthly Adj. 
Gross Income 
Prom 
701 -
726 -
761 -
776 -
801 -
826 -
851 -
876 -
901 -
926 -
951 -
976 -
1,001 -
lb 
725 
750 
775 
800 
825 
850 
875 
900 
925 
950 
975 
1,000 
1,050 
1 
68 
90 
113 
2 
68 
91 
114 
137 
159 
182 
205 
228 
250 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.14, enacted by L. 
1994, ch. 118, § 15. 
Number of Children 
3 
69 
92 
115 
138 
161 
184 
207 
230 
253 
276 
299 
4 
70 
93 
116 
140 
163 
186 
209 
233 
256 
279 
302 
326 
372 
78-45-7.15 
5 
71 
94 
118 
141 
165 
188 
212 
235 
259 
282 
306 
329 
376 
7.14, as last amended by Laws 1990, cb 
§ 10, containing the "Base Combined 
6 
71 
95 
119 
143 
166 
190 
214 
238 
261 
285 
309 
333 
380 
i. 100, 
Child 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 
1994, ch. 118, § 15 repeals former § 78-45-
Support Obligation Table," and enacts the 
present section, effective July 1, 1994. 
78-45-7.15. Medical expenses. 
(1) The court shall order that insurance for the medical expenses of the 
minor children be provided by a parent if it is available at a reasonable cost. 
(2) In determining which parent shall be ordered to maintain insurance for 
medical expenses, the court or administrative agency may consider the: 
(a) reasonableness of the cost; 
(b) availability of a group insurance policy; 
(c) coverage of the policy, and 
(d) preference of the custodial parent 
(3) The order shall require each parent to share equally the out-of-pocket 
costs of the premium actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of 
insurance. 
(4) The children's portion of the premium is a per capita share of the 
premium actually paid. The premium expense for the children shall be 
calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered 
under the policy and multiplying the result by the number of children in the 
instant case. 
(5) The order shall require each parent to share equally all reasonable and 
necessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and copayments, 
incurred for the dependent children. 
(6) The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of 
coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title 
IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial 
enrollment of the dependent children, and thereafter on or before January 2 of 
each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other parent, or the Office of 
Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 
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601 et seq., of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 
calendar days of the date he first knew or should have known of the change. 
(7) A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification 
of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days 
of payment. 
(8) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a parent 
incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the 
expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent 
fails to comply with Subsections (6) and (7). 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.15, enacted by L. the present section, effective July 1,1994. 
1994, ch. 118, § 16; 1995, ch. 258, $ 14, Amendment Notes. - The 1995 amend-
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws ment, effective May 1,1995, deleted "and actu-
1994, ch. 118, § 16 repeals former § 78-45- ally paid by the parents" after "children" at the 
7.15, as last amended by Laws 1990, ch. 100,
 end of Subsection (5). § 11, relating to medical expenses, and enacts 
78-45-7.16. Child care expenses — Expenses not incurred. 
(1) The child support order shall require that each parent share equally the 
reasonable work-related child care expenses of the parents. 
(2) (a) If an actual expense for child care is incurred, a parent shall begin 
paying his share on a monthly basis immediately upon presentation of 
proof of the child care expense, but if the child care expense ceases to be 
incurred, that parent may suspend making monthly payment of that 
expense while it is not being incurred, without obtaining a modification of 
the child support order. 
(b) (i) In the absence of a court order to the contrary, a parent who 
incurs child care expense shall provide written verification of the cost 
and identity of a child care provider to the other parent upon initial 
engagement of a provider and thereafter on the request of the other 
parent. 
(ii) In the absence of a court order to the contrary, the parent shall 
notify the other parent of any change of child care provider or the 
monthly expense of child care within 30 calendar days of the date of 
the change. 
(3) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a parent 
incurring child care expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the 
expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if the parent 
incurring the expenses fails to comply with Subsection (2Kb). 
History: C. 1968,78-45-7.16, enacted by L. 
1989,ch.214,$ 18; 1990, ch. 100, { 12; 1994, 
oh. 118,5 17. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, efifective July 1, 1994, rewrote this sec-
tion which read "(1) The monthly amount to be 
paid for reasonable work related child care 
costs actually incurred on behalf of the depen-
dent children of the parents shall be specified 
as a separate monthly amount in the order. 
"(2) If an actual expense included in an 
amount specified in the order ceases to be 
incurred, the obligor may suspend making 
monthly payment of that expense while it is not 
being incurred, without obtaining a modifica-
tion of the child support order." 
712 
UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT 78-45-7.19 
78-45-7.17, Child care costs. 
(1) The need to include child care costs in the child support order is 
presumed, if the custodial parent or the noncustodial parent, during extended 
visitation, is working and actually incurring the child care costs. 
(2) The need to include child care costs is not presumed, but may be awarded 
on a case-by-case basis, if the costs are related to the career or occupational 
training of the custodial parent, or if otherwise ordered by the court in the 
interest of justice. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.17, enacted by L. tion" in Subsection (1); added "or if otherwise 
1989, ch. 214, § 19; 1994, ch. 118, § 18- ordered by the court in the interest of justice* at 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- the end of Subsection (2); and made stylistic 
ment, effective July 1, 1994, inserted "or the changes, 
noncustodial parent, during extended visita-
78-45-7.18. Limitation on amount of support ordered. 
(1) There is no maximum limit on the base child support award that may be 
ordered using the base combined child support obligation table, using the low 
income table, or awarding medical expenses except under Subsection (2). 
(2) If amounts under either table as provided in Section 78-45-7.14 in 
combination with the award of medical expenses exceeds 50% of the obligor's 
adjusted gross income, or by adding the child care costs, total child support 
would exceed 50% of the obligor's adjusted gross income, the presumption 
under Section 78-45-7.17 is rebutted. 
History: C. 1953,78-46-7.18, enacted by L. stituted I f amounts under either table as pro-
1989, ch. 214, § 20; 1990, ch. 100, § 13; 1994, vided in Section 78-45-7.14 in combination with 
ch. 118, § 19. the award of medical expenses* for I f the 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- combination of the two amounts under Subsec-
ment, effective July 1,1994, substituted "using tion (1)" at the beginning of Subsection (2); and 
the low income table, or awarding* for "or for made stylistic changes, 
the award of uninsured" in Subsection (1); sub-
78-45-7.19. Determination of parental liability. 
(1) The district court or administrative agency may issue an order deter-
mining the amount of a parent's liability for medical expenses of a dependent 
child when the parent: 
(a) is required by a prior court or administrative order to: 
(i) share those expenses with the other parent of the dependent 
child; or 
(ii) obtain insurance for medical expenses but fails to do so; or 
(b) receives direct payment from an insurer under insurance coverage 
obtained after the prior court or administrative order was issued. 
(2) If the prior court or administrative order does not specify what propor-
tions of the expenses are to be shared, the district court may determine the 
amount of liability as may be reasonable and necessary. 
(3) This section applies to an order without regard to when it was issued. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.19, enacted by L. ment, effective July 1, 1994, inserted "or ad-
1990, ch. 166, § 4; 1994, ch. 118, § 20. ministrative agency" and substituted "medical 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- expenses'* for "uninsured medical, hospital, and 
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dental expenses" in the introductory language dental care insurance" in Subsection dXaXii); 
of Subsection (1); substituted "insurance for and made a stylistic change, 
medical expenses'* for "medical, hospital, or 
78-45-7.20. Accountability of support provided to benefit 
child — Accounting. 
(1) The court or administrative agency which issues the initial or modified 
order for child support may, upon the petition of the obligor, order prospectively 
the obligee to furnish an accounting of amoimts provided for the child's benefit 
to the obligor, including an accounting or receipts. 
(2) The court or administrative agency may prescribe the frequency and the 
form of the accounting which shall include receipts and an accounting. 
(3) The obligor may petition for the accounting only if current on all child 
support that has been ordered. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.20, enacted by L. Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 118, § 23 
1994, ch. 118, S 21. makes the act effective on July 1,1994. 
78-45-7.2L Award of tax exemption for dependent chil-
dren. 
(1) No presumption exists as to which parent should be awarded the right to 
claim a child or children as exemptions for federal and state income tax 
purposes. Unless the parties otherwise stipulate in writing, the court or 
administrative agency shall award in any final order the exemption on a 
case-by-case basis. 
(2) In awarding the exemption, the court or administrative agency shall 
consider: 
(a) as the primary factor, the relative contribution of each parent to the 
cost of raising the child; and 
03) among other factors, the relative tax benefit to each parent. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), the court or administrative agency may 
not award any exemption to the noncustodial parent if that parent is not 
current in his child support obligation, in which case the court or administra-
tive agency may award an exemption to the custodial parent. 
(4) An exemption may not be awarded to a parent unless the award will 
result in a tax benefit to that parent. 
History:C.1953,78-45^7^1,enactedbyL. Effective Dates. -Laws 1994, ch. 118, § 23 
1994, ch. 118, i 22. makes the act effective on July 1,1994. 
78-45-8. Continuing jurisdiction* 
The court shall retain jurisdiction to modify or vacate the order of support 
where justice requires. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, { 8. 
Cross-References. — General jurisdiction 
of district court, § 78-3-4. 
714 
UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT 78-45-9 
78-45-9. Enforcement of right of support. 
(1) (a) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor. The 
office may proceed pursuant to this chapter or any other applicable statute 
on behalf of: 
(i) the Department of Human Services; 
(ii) any other department or agency of this state that provides 
public assistance, as defined by Subsection 62A-ll-303(3), to enforce 
the right to recover public assistance; or 
(iii) the obligee, to enforce the obligee's right of support against the 
obligor. 
(b) Whenever any court action is commenced by the office to enforce 
payment of the obligor's support obligation, the attorney general or the 
county attorney of the county of residence of the obligee shall represent the 
office. 
(2) (a) A person may not commence an action, file a pleading, or submit a 
written stipulation to the court, without complying with Subsection (2Kb), 
if the purpose or effect of the action, pleading, or stipulation is to: 
(i) establish paternity; 
(ii) establish or modify a support obligation; 
(iii) change the court-ordered manner of payment of support; or 
(iv) recover support due or owing. 
(b) (i) When taking an action described in Subsection (2)(a), a person 
must file an affidavit with the court at the time the action is 
commenced, the pleading is filed, or the stipulation is submitted 
stating whether child support services have been or are being pro-
vided under Part IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C., Section 601 
et seq., on behalf of a child who is a subject of the action, pleading, or 
stipulation. 
(ii) If child support services have been or are being provided, under 
Part IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C., Section 601 et seq., the 
person shall mail a copy of the affidavit and a copy of the pleading or 
stipulation to the Office of the Attorney General, Child Support 
Division. 
(iii) If notice is not given in accordance with this subsection, the 
office is not bound by any decision, judgment, agreement, or compro-
mise rendered in the action. 
(c) If IV-D services have been or are being provided, that person shall 
join the office as a party to the action, or mail or deliver a written request 
to the Office of the Attorney General, Child Support Division asking the 
office to join as a party to the action. A copy of that request, along with 
proof of service, shall be filed with the court. The office shall be repre-
sented as provided in Subsection (1Kb). 
(3) Neither the attorney general nor the county attorney represents or has 
an attorney-client relationship with the obligee or the obligor in carrying out 
the duties under this chapter. 
History: L. 1057, ch. 110,5 9; 1975, ch. 96, 
i 23; 1977, ch. 145, § 11; 1982, ch. 63, $ 2; 
1989, ch. 62, 5 23; 1990, ch. 183, fi 69; 1994, 
ch. 140,5 16; 1995, ch. 258, § 15. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective May 2, 1994, rewrote Subsec-
tion (2Xa) which read "A person may not com-
mence any action or file a pleading to establish 
or modify a support obligation or to recover 
support due or owing, whether under this chap-
ter or any other applicable statute, without 
filing an affidavit with the court at the time the 
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action is commenced or the pleading is filed 
stating whether public assistance has been or is 
being provided on behalf of a dependent child of 
the person commencing the action or filing the 
pleading*; added the designation for Subsection 
(2Kb) and the second sentence in the subsec-
tion; redesignated former Subsection (2Kb) as 
Subsection (2Xc) and added the language be-
ginning "or mail or deliver" at the end of the 
first sentence and inserted the second sentence 
therein; deleted former Subsection (3) which 
read "As used in this section 'office* means the 
Office of Recovery Services within the Depart-
ment of Human Services"; and added Subsec-
tion (3). 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1,1995, 
substituted "child support services have been 
or are being provided under Part IV of the 
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C., Section 601 et 
ANALYSIS 
Discharge of debts. 
— Bankruptcy 
Enforcement by one other than obligee. 
— Mother. 
Divorce. 
Estoppel. 
— Parents' actions and agreements. 
—Provision of support by other parties. 
Intervention by state. 
— Divorce. 
— Public assistance. 
Taking of deposition. 
Reimbursement of department. 
—Divorce. 
Alimony payments. 
Child support 
Discharge of debts. 
—Bankruptcy. 
Support debts owing to Department of Social 
Services are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
State v. Bodily, 652 P.2d 644 (Utah 1976). 
Enforcement by one other than obligee. 
—Mother. 
— —Divorce. 
This act does not provide the exclusive rem-
edy to procure support for minor children; this 
section is permissive, not mandatory, and does 
not foreclose the right of one other than obligee 
to enforce the duty of support by any other 
means provided by law. Mother could enforce 
children's support rights on countermotion for 
modification of divorce decree; this section did 
not make support rights enforceable by chil-
dren alone, after their attainment of majority; 
since children were retarded and would require 
seq." for "public assistance has been or is being 
provided" in Subsection (2XbXi) and (2XbXii); 
added "of the Attorney General, Child Support 
Division" at the end of Subsection (2XbXii) and 
in Subsection (2Xc); added Subsection 
(2XbXiii); substituted "IV-D services have been 
or are" for "public assistance has been or is" in 
Subsection (2Xc); and made numerous stylistic 
changes. 
Cross-References. — Enforcement of sup-
port provisions by Department of Human Ser-
vices, § 62A-1-111. 
General duties of attorney general, § 67-5-1. 
General duties of county attorney, § 17-18-1. 
Office of Recovery Services responsible to 
carry out obligations of Department of Human 
Services to collect child support, § 62A-11-104. 
Public support of children, § 62A-11-301 et 
seq. 
specialized care throughout their lives, di-
vorced father was ordered to continue support 
payments indefinitely, irrespective of the chil-
dren's chronological age. Dehm v. Dehm, 545 
P.2d 525 (Utah 1976). 
Estoppel. 
—Parents9 actions and agreements. 
A decree awarding child support payments 
for a child cannot be avoided by the conduct or 
agreement of the parents. French v. Johnson, 
16 Utah 2d 360, 401 P.2d 315 (1965). 
—Provision of suppor t by o ther par t ies . 
Children have a right to support, but where 
their mother and her second husband had pro-
vided it, mother was estopped to demand that 
her first husband also contribute support; since 
her demand was not in the nature of a claim for 
reimbursement, to grant it would have been in 
effect to give the children "double support" to 
which they were not entitled. Wasescha v. 
Wasescha, 548 R2d 895 (Utah 1976). 
Intervention by state. 
—Divorce. 
'While state could properly intervene in di-
vorce proceeding to secure reimbursement from 
father of public moneys expended for support of 
child, it was not entitled to intervene to secure 
reimbursement of funds expended for support 
of mother, the wife's right to alimony or support 
was dependent upon facts to be brought out in 
the course of the divorce proceeding and was 
not established until a judgment issued 
therein, so prior to that time the state's right to 
reimbursement was merely conjectural. Reeves 
v. Reeves, 556 P.2d 1267 (Utah 1976). 
—Public assistance* 
Where divorced wife and her four children 
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were living on public assistance, it was proper 
for Department of Social Services to intervene 
on her behalf in an action by her to force her 
ex-husband to make 32 monthly child support 
-payments which he then owed. Bartholomew v. 
Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238 (Utah 1976). 
Taking of deposition. 
Intervention by state pursuant to this section 
and § 62A-11-301 et seq. in action by ex-wife, 
who was welfare recipient, to compel ex-hus-
band to make delinquent child support pay-
ments, while proper, was not sufficient to en-
title the state to take the ex-husband's 
deposition without first either commencing a 
new action or obtaining an order to show cause. 
Mattingly v. Mattingly, 562 P.2d 1254 (Utah 
1977). 
Reimbursement of department . 
— Divorce. 
Alimony payments. 
The Department of Social Service's right to 
reimbursement from ex-husband for welfare 
payments made to his ex-wife subsequent to 
the divorce is limited to his duty of support as 
set out in the divorce decree. Mecham v. 
Mecham, 570 R2d 123 (Utah 1977). 
Department of Social Services was not en-
titled to reimbursement from ex-husband, 
based upon ex-husband's duty of support of his 
wife as set out in the divorce decree, for neces-
sities furnished the ex-wife subsequent to the 
divorce, where the parties by contract had 
modified the ex-husband's duty of support as 
set out in the decree, and the husband had 
satisfied his duty as modified. Gulley v. Gulley, 
570 R2d 127 (Utah 1977). 
Child support. 
Father had a continuing and inalienable duty 
founded in natural law to support his children, 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Desertion and 
Nonsupport §§ 25, 82. 
C . J . S . - 4 1 CJ .S . Husband and Wife §§ 48 
et seq., 241; 67ACJ.S. Parent and Child §§ 73 
to 89. 
AXJL — Validity and construction of provi-
sion for arbitration of disputes as to alimony or 
support payments, or child visitation or custody 
78-45-9.1. Repealed. 
Repeals. - Section 78-45-9.1 (L. 1982, ch. 
63, § 3), relating to court's order for assign-
ment, support lien, or garnishment of obligor's 
and a necessary concomitant of this duty was 
an obligation to reimburse one who paid for 
such support to rescue children he left in need; 
therefore, the Division (now Department) of 
Family Services was not required to obtain a 
court order establishing defendant father's ob-
ligation to pay a specific monthly sum before it 
could bring suit under this section for reim-
bursement State Div. of Family Servs. v. Clark, 
554 P.2d 1310 (Utah 1976). 
Department of Social Services was entitled to 
reimbursement from father of children, based 
upon the father's duty of support as set out in a 
divorce decree, for necessities furnished the 
children, despite father's contract with the chil-
dren's mother releasing him from support pay-
ments in exchange for payment of lump-sum 
cash to the mother, since a father has a statu-
tory duty to support his children which may not 
be contracted away. Gulley v. Gulley, 570 P.2d 
127 (Utah 1977). 
State Department of Social Services, which 
was joined as a party to the divorce action 
before court entered order determining hus-
band's obligation for child support, was entitled 
to reimbursement from the husband for assis-
tance furnished the child before entry of the 
support order in the amount as fixed in the 
support order. Roberts v. Roberts, 592 P.2d 597 
(Utah 1979). 
Where Department of Social Services did not 
participate in the divorce proceeding because it 
was not notified of such proceeding, and the 
divorce decree made no mention of temporary 
alimony or child support or arrearages of ei-
ther, the divorce decree was not res judicata as 
to father's liability for arrearages of child sup-
port and did not bar the department's right to 
reimbursement from the father for child sup-
port provided to the mother during the pen-
dency of the divorce. Knudson v. Utah State 
Dept of Social Servs., 660 R2d 258 (Utah 1983). 
matters, 18 AJLR.3d 1264. 
Power of divorce court, after child attained 
majority, to enforce by contempt proceedings 
payment of arrears of child support, 32 
AXJL8d888. 
Key Numbers* — Husband and Wife «=> 4; 
Parent and Child «=* 3.3(3). 
income and covering responsibilities of the em-
ployer, was repealed by Laws 1984, ch. 14, § 3, 
effective July 1,1984. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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78-45-9.2. County attorney to assist obligee. 
The county attorney's office shall provide assistance to an obligee desiring to 
proceed under this act in the following manner: 
(1) provide forms, approved by the Judicial Council of Utah, for an order 
of wage assignment if the obligee is not represented by legal counsel; 
(2) the county attorney's office may charge a fee not to exceed $25 for 
providing assistance to an obligee under Subsection (1). 
(3) inform the obligee of the right to file impecuniously if the obligee is 
unable to bear the expenses of the action and assist the obligee with such 
filing; 
(4) advise the obligee of the available methods for service of process; 
and 
(5) assist the obligee in expeditiously scheduling a hearing before the 
court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-9.2, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Creation of Judicial 
1983, ch. 119, 5 1. Council, Utah Const., Art. VHI, Sec. 12; § 78-
Meaning of "this act." - The term "this 3-21. 
act," in the introductory language, means Laws General duties of county attorney, § 17-18-1. 
1983, ch. 119, which enacted this section. Service of process, Rules 4, 5, U.R.C.R 
78-45-10. Appeals. 
Appeals may be taken from orders and judgments under this act as in other 
civil actions. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 10. Cross-References. — Appeals generally, 
Meaning of "this act* — See note under Rules 3 to 13, U.RA.P. 
same catchline following § 78-45-1. 
78-45-11. Husband and wife privileged communication 
inapplicable — Competency of spouses. 
Laws attaching a privilege against the disclosure of communications be-
tween husband and wife are inapplicable under this act. Spouses are compe-
tent witnesses to testify to any relevant matter, including marriage and 
parentage. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, $ 11. civil actions generally, § 78-24-8; Rule 602, 
Meaning of "this act." — See note under U.R.E. 
same catchline following § 78-46-1. Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, mari-
Cross-References. — Marital privilege in tal privilege inapplicable to, § 77-81-22. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 81 Am, Jur. 2d Witnesses CJJS. - 97 CJ.S. Witnesses § 266 et seq. 
§ 296 et seq. Key Numbers. — Witnesses «=» 187 et seq. 
78-45-12. Rights are in addition to those presently exist-
ing. 
The rights herein created are in addition to and not in substitution to any 
other rights, 
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History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 12. 
78-45-13. Interpretation and construction. 
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general 
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it. 
History: L.1957, ch, 110, § 14. Cross-References. — Construction of stat-
Meaning of "this act." — See note under utes, Title 68, Chapter 3. 
same catchline following § 78-46-1. 
CHAPTER 45a 
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY 
Section 
78-45a-l. 
78-45a-2. 
78-45a-3. 
78-45a-4. 
78-45a-5. 
78-45a-6. 
78-45a-6.5. 
78-45a-7. 
78-45a-8. 
Obligations of the father. 
Determination of paternity — 
Effect — Enforcement. 
Limitation on recovery from the 
father. 
Limitations on recovery from fa-
ther's estate. 
Remedies. 
Time of trial. 
Paternity action — Jury trial. 
Authority for genetic testing. 
Selection of experts. 
Section 
78-45a-9. 
78-45a-10. 
78-45a-10.5. 
78-45a-ll. 
78-45a-12. 
78-45a-13 
78-45a-14 
78-45a-15. 
78-45a-16. 
78-45a-17. 
Compensation of expert wit-
nesses. 
Effect of genetic test results. 
Visitation rights of father. 
Judgment. 
Security. 
Settlement agreements. 
Venue. 
Uniformity of interpretation. 
Short title. 
Operation of act. 
78-45a-l. Obligations of the father. 
The father of a child that is or may be born outside of marriage is liable to 
the same extent as the father of a child born within marriage, whether or not 
the child is born alive, for the reasonable expense of the mother's pregnancy 
and confinement and for the education, necessary support, and any funeral 
expenses for the child. For purposes of child support collection, a child born 
outside of marriage includes a child born to a married woman by a man other 
than her husband if that paternity has been established. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 168, § 1; 1990, ch. Cross-References. — Public support of chil-
245, S 22. dren, § 62A-11-301 et seq. 
Uniform Laws. — Other jurisdictions Uniform Civil Liability for Sup port Act, § 78-
adopting the Uniform Act on Paternity are 45-1 et seq. 
Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
and Rhode Island. Act, § 77-31-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cause of action for support. 
Custody rights. 
—Acknowledgment of paternity. 
Right to trial by jury. 
Action for reimbursement. 
— Collateral estoppel. 
Where, in a paternity action brought for 
ANALYSIS 
Action for reimbursement. 
— Collateral estoppel. 
— Costs. 
Action to establish paternity. 
—Attorney fees. 
— Statute of limitations. 
lulling. 
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